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Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union:
Incrementalism or a “Big Bang”?
by
Niamh Moloney*
This article considers the institutional governance issues raised by Capital Markets Union
(CMU) and suggests that the preferences of administrative actors are likely to have a deter-
minative influence on how institutional governance develops as the CMU project evolves.
Specifically, the incentives, powers, and preferences of ESMA (the European Securities and
Markets Authority) are likely to have a significant effect on how institutional governance for
the EU capital market develops as the CMU project beds in. Member States’ preferences will
continue to exert a strong influence but this is most likely to be with respect to whether further
centralization of institutional governance for the euro area will occur, as is clear from the
February 2016 ‘New Settlement’ between the EU and the UK, agreed by the European
Council. The article also considers the likely pace and nature of the future evolution of
institutional governance for the EU capital market. It draws on the insights of experimen-
talist governance theory and on empirical observation of ESMA’s recent activities to suggest
that incremental change, rather than a ‘big bang,’ is likely. It remains to be seen whether the
CMU agenda injects an accelerating factor into this evolutionary process or, conversely, and
by distracting the EU from necessary institutional reforms, disrupts incremental develop-
ments.
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I. Institutional Design and EU Financial System Governance
1. Introduction
Capital Markets Union (CMU) is the EU’s current political and policy pre-
occupation in the financial governance sphere. While associated in particular
with the summer 2014 appointment of Commission President Juncker,1 its
formal launch came with the Commission’s Green Paper in February 20152
which was followed by the presentation of the Commission’s Action Plan in
September 2015.3 CMU has two flagship initiatives: reform of the harmonized
prospectus regime (a proposal was presented in November 20154); and the
adoption of a harmonized regime for securitizations, including a specific re-
gimefor ‘simple, transparent, andstandardized’securitizations5 (political agree-
ment on the securitization proposals was reached by the ECOFIN Council on
8 December 2015). The CMU agenda includes, however, a host of regulatory
and non-regulatory initiatives, including, in the short to medium-term, with
respect to covered bonds, investment fund reform, private placements, crowd-
funding, and the infrastructure supporting the transmission of information on
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); and, on a more long-term basis,
the potential harmonization of insolvency and taxation regimes. CMU is con-
cerned with the fund-raising capacity of the single EU capital market and, in
particular: with the improvement of access to finance by all companies but
particularly SMEs; with an increase in and the diversification of sources of
funding beyond the currently dominant bank funding channel; and with the
achievement of a more efficient and effective EU capital market. The CMU
agenda is framed by five priorities: it should provide more funding choices for
Europe’s businesses and SMEs; ensure an appropriate regulatory environment
1 CMU forms part of the Juncker Commission agenda: ‘A New Start for Europe: My
Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Political Guidelines for the
next European Commission’, 22 October 2014.
2 Commission (EC), ‘Building a Capital Markets Union’ (Green Paper) COM (2015) 63,
18 February 2015.
3 Commission (EC), ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’ COM (2015) 468,
30 September 2015.
4 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or
admitted to trading’ COM (2015) 583, 30 November 2015.
5 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit
institutions and investment firms’ COM (2015) 473, 30 September 2015; and Commis-
sion (EC), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
laying down common rules on securitization and creating a European framework for
simple, transparent and standardised securitisation’ COM (2015) 472, 30 September
2015. Related reforms have been made to the Solvency II regime (C(2015) 6588/2).
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for the long-term and sustainable investment and financing of Europe’s infra-
structure; increase investment choices for retail and institutional investors;
enhance the capacity of banks to lend; and bring down cross-border barriers
and develop capital markets for all 28 Member States.6
CMU, despite its currency and notwithstanding the attention it is receiving
politically (including in connection with the European Council’s February
2016 ‘New Settlement’ for the UK within the EU which, inter alia, addresses
the interaction between euro area and non-euro-area financial governance and
which has implications for the CMU project7), from the market, and from the
EU institutions,8 presents a dilemma. Does it mark a significant moment for EU
financial governance (which can be regarded as the matrix of rules, supervisory
practices, enforcement mechanisms, resolution/recovery devices, and the sup-
porting institutional infrastructure which governs the EU financial system) and
related scholarship? Or is it simply another example – one among the many – of
incrementalism in EU financial governance? Is there a danger of mistaking the
spectacular but potentially transient political pyrotechnics associated with the
CMU project for real innovation in EU financial governance? Might the CMU
agenda distract from, for example, functional weaknesses, legal ambiguities, or
constitutional tensions in EU financial governance more generally and which
are of wider significance? Ultimately, does CMU provide a productive case
study which can be used to critique EU financial governance?
This article suggests that the institutional governance issues raised by the CMU
agenda, and in particular the implications for the European System of Financial
Supervision (ESFS), are worthy of examination.9 The institutional governance
structures of the ESFS have only recently emerged from their crisis-era crucible.
They are still in an experimental phase: constitutional, functional, institutional,
and political tensions and pressures remain considerable. A cognate literature
6 Action Plan (n 3) 4–6. A status report on progress was issued by the European Commis-
sion in April 2016 (SWD (2016) 147).
7 Decision of the Heads of State or Government Meeting Within the European Council,
‘Concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom with the European Union,’
European Council Meeting, 18 and 19 February 2016 (EUCO 1/16), Annex 1. The
relevant principles are set out in Annex 1, Section A, Economic Governance. The Deci-
sion takes effect only if the UK decides to remain a member of the EU.
8 The European Parliament (Resolution on ‘Building a Capital Markets Union’ B8-0655/
2015, 1 July 2015), ECB (‘Building a Capital Markets Union – Eurosystem Contribution
to the European Commission’s Green Paper’, 2015), and European Council (‘Resolution
of 10 November 2015’ Press Release 791/15) are broadly supportive.
9 For a consideration of the further implications of the CMU project see eg N Moloney,
‘Capital Markets Union: “Ever Closer Union” for the EU Financial System?’ (2016)
ELRev, forthcoming and the discussions in the 2015 (3) Special Edition of the Law and
Financial Markets Review.
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is fast developing which seeks to conceptualize the related nascent administra-
tive law and to understand the forces shaping the new institutional structures.10
This article seeks to contribute to this emerging scholarship by speculating on
how institutional governance for the EU capital market is likely to evolve in the
context of CMU. To do so, it draws on empirical observation – particularly of
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) which operates within
the ESFS – and on related scholarship. It suggests that the predictions of the
relevant political economy literature as to the determinative influence of Mem-
ber States’ preferences but also, increasingly, of the preferences of administra-
tive actors – chief among them financial regulators – on the evolution of institu-
tional governance are likely to be borne out over the CMU reform period.
While Member States’ preferences are likely to exert a strong influence on the
evolution of institutional design for the EU capital market, this is most likely to
be with respect to any further centralization of institutional governance for the
euro area, as is clear from the February 2016 ‘New Settlement’ for the UK.11
ESMA, however, is likely to emerge as the primary operational influence on
how institutional governance develops for the EU/single capital market as a
whole as the CMU agenda beds in.
The article also considers a related question as to the likely pace and nature of
the evolution of institutional governance for the EU capital market. It suggests
that ESMA-led change is likely to be incremental. A dynamic, fluid, and
responsive process will likely develop through which national financial regu-
lators and ESMA will converge towards a more European approach to capital
market governance. It remains to be seen whether the CMU agenda will inject
an accelerating factor into this evolutionary process or, conversely, and by
distracting the EU from necessary institutional reforms, disrupt the current
evolutionary trajectory.
Section I considers the interaction between the CMU reform agenda and
institutional governance and situates the analysis within relevant scholarship.
Section II outlines the current institutional structure. Section III considers
how the institutional question should be framed – as a ‘Capital Markets
Union’ question, or as a question for a more elusive ‘Financial Union’?
Section IV considers the institutional governance implications with respect
to regulatory governance. Section V considers the implications with respect to
supervisory governance. Section VI concludes.
10 For recent examples see, eg: E Ferran, ‘The Existential Search of the European Banking
Authority’ (2015) ECGI Law Working Paper No. 297/2015 <http://ssrn.com/ab
stract=2634904>; and M Busuioc, ‘Rule-making by the European Financial Supervisory
Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope’ (2013) 19 ELJ 111.
11 N 7.
ECFR 2/2016Niamh Moloney380
 - 10.1515/ecfr-2016-0376
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/01/2016 03:49:54PM
via London School of Economics and Political Science
2. CMU and Institutional Governance: A Question Worth Asking
Does the CMU agenda present a useful case study for the assessment of EU
financial governance? In many respects, there is nothing new about the CMU
project.12 CMU is a – broadly – regulatory agenda; it is designed to support
market-based finance; and it is directed to the construction of a single market in
capital. All of these features have long been associated with EU financial market
law and policy. They can be found as far back as 1966, in the seminal Segré
Report on a European capital market.13 More recently, the 1999 Financial Serv-
ices Action Plan (FSAP), which laid the foundations of EU financial market law
as currently constituted, had all these features.14 Even over the crisis-era, during
which the EU policy and political community was primarily concerned with
financial stability, reforms were adopted which deployed harmonized regula-
tion to support the embedding of market finance and of cross-border capital-
raising. These include: the ‘SME Growth Market’ reform adopted under the
2014 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive to ease market access by
SMEs;15 the calibrations to the 2012 European Market Infrastructure Regula-
tion (EMIR) designed to protect non-financial counterparties from excessive
regulatory costs when engaging in hedging through derivatives;16 and the series
of fund-structure-related reforms designed to support capital accumulation and
allocation, including the 2013 European Venture Capital Regulation and the
2015 European Long Term Investment Fund Regulation.17
It is also the case that CMU might prove something of a distraction. The massive
crisis-era reform process closed with the completion of the 2010–2014 Parlia-
mentary term in April 2014 and the adoption of the last major suite of crisis-era
measures. The legal architecture for Banking Union is now, for the most part, in
12 See further Moloney (n 9).
13 ’Report by a Group of Experts Appointed by the EEC Commission, The Development
of a European Capital Market’, 1966.
14 Commission (EC), ‘Communication on Implementing the Framework for Financial
Markets. Action Plan’ COM (1999) 232, 11 May 1999 (FSAP).
15 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU
[2014] OJ L173/349 (MiFID II), art 33. MiFID II is accompanied by Regulation (EU)
No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial
instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 [2014] OJ L173/84 (MiFIR).
16 Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC
derivatives, central counterparties, and trade repositories [2012] OJ L201/1 (European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)).
17 Regulation (EU) No. 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
European Venture Capital Funds [2013] OJ L115/1 and Regulation (EU) No. 760/
2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Long-term Invest-
ment Funds [2015] OJ L123/98.
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place. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is established and the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is now operational and in a ‘business as usual’
phase. With respect to the SSM, the ECB has, for example, concluded its initial
series of ‘SREP’ (Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process) supervisory ex-
ercises – which are required under CRD IV/CRR18 of all EU bank supervisors –
over the banks within its direct supervision,19 and has set out its supervisory
priorities for 2016.20 With respect to regulatory governance, the EU’s institu-
tional apparatus is now turning to review of the crisis-era reforms. Summer/
Autumn 2015 saw the Commission launch major consultations on the market
impact of the CRD IV/CRR reforms21 and on the impact of EU financial reg-
ulation more generally,22 while the European Parliament has examined how the
EU should review the recent reforms and position the financial governance
agenda for the future.23 The review clauses contained in the crisis-era measures
are beginning to activate24 while empirical evidence on the impact of the EU’s
crisis-era reform programme is slowly emerging.25 The time for review and
assessment has arrived.
But this review and assessment must include institutional governance, partic-
ularly given the richness of the empirical observation now possible of the
ESFS and of the ESAs since their 2011 foundation. The performance of the
ESFS and the ESAs was subject to formal review by the Commission in 201426
18 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending
Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 [2013] OJ L176/1; and Directive 2013/36/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council on access to the activity of credit institutions
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ
L176/338.
19 ECB, ‘Annual Report on Supervisory Activities 2014’ (2015) and ‘Annual Report on
Supervisory Activities 2015’ (2016).
20 ECB, Banking Supervision, Press Release 6 January 2016.
21 Commission (EC), ‘Possible Impact of the CRR and CRD IVon Bank Financing of the
Economy’, 15 July 2015.
22 Commission (EC), ‘Call for Evidence: EU Regulatory Framework for Financial Serv-
ices’, 30 September 2015.
23 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Stocktaking and Challenges of the EU Financial
Services Regulation: impact and the way forward towards a more efficient and effective
EU framework for financial regulation and a Capital Markets Union’, 19 January 2016
(P8_TA-PROV2016(0006)) (Balz Resolution).
24 EMIR, eg, is currently being reviewed: Commission (EC), ‘Public Consultation on
EMIR’, 21 May 2015.
25 Eg, EBA, ‘Overview of the potential implications of regulatory measures for banks’
business models’, 9 February 2015.
26 Commission (EC), ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and
Council on the operation of the ESAs and the ESFS’ COM (2014) 509, 8 August 2014.
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and a related reform agenda is expected (by mid 2016). The CMU project
provides, however, a useful launch-pad from which to examine further the
likely future evolution of institutional governance for the EU capital market.
Review is all the more necessary given the increasingly problematic inter-
connection between CMU governance and euro area governance and the as
yet untested impact of the February 2016 ‘New Settlement’ between the EU
and the UK.
3. Institutional Design and EU Financial Governance
Where, accordingly, to situate this discussion of CMU and of related institu-
tional governance for the EU capital market, and how to identify the major
points of contestation?
Since its inception, EU financial governance has primarily been a function of
inter-institutional rule-making. Legal scholarship on EU regulatory gover-
nance has long been pre-occupied with related questions including, for exam-
ple, the identification of the optimal balance between harmonization and
regulatory competition and between EU and Member State intervention.27
In sharp contrast with financial governance at domestic/Member State levels,
where, and reflecting the growth of the modern administrative state, techno-
cratic agencies have been conferred with discrete rule-making, supervisory,
and enforcement powers to achieve statutory objectives with respect to finan-
cial governance,28 the EU has been slow to engage with related institution-
building. EU financial governance has typically operated within the EU’s
wider institutional arrangements and, specifically, within the arrangements
governing the adoption of legislation by the co-legislators and of administra-
tive technical rules by the Commission. This feature of EU financial gover-
nance reflects in part the location of supervision and enforcement at national
level and the related absence, until recently, of pressure for institutional re-
forms given the long preoccupation of EU financial governance with market
liberalization through regulatory governance.29
27 See, eg, L Enriques and M Gatti, ‘Is there a Uniform EU Securities Law After the
Financial Services Action Plan?’ (2008) 14 Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Fi-
nance 43.
28 For a US perspective see E Barkow, ‘Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design’ (2010) 89 Texas Law Review 15 and, relating national administra-
tive developments to the slow evolution of administrative structures at the global level,
M Barr, ‘Who’s in Charge of Global Finance’ (2014) 4 Georgetown Journal of Interna-
tional Law 971.
29 See, eg, from a political economy perspective, L Quaglia, Governing Financial Services
in the European Union. Banking, Securities, and Post-trading (Routledge, Oxford
ECFR 2/2016 Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union 383
 - 10.1515/ecfr-2016-0376
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/01/2016 03:49:54PM
via London School of Economics and Political Science
But although institution-building has been a latecomer to EU financial gover-
nance, its progress has been shaped by deeply rooted political and market forces
and by powerful and longstanding constitutional constraints. Institutional de-
sign decisions, when they arise, typically expose the deep-set constitutional,
institutional, and political fault-lines which rumble underneath the EU finan-
cial system. When exposed to stress during the institution-building process,
these fault-lines have been shown to have a determinative influence on institu-
tional design, and on the related balance of competence between the EU and its
Member States. These fault-lines can be hidden during the regulatory process,
given the multiple opportunities for ambiguity, compromise, escape, and ob-
fuscation which this process generates. By contrast, institution-building, given
the legacy risks which it generates and the relatively clear ‘bright-line’ decisions
it requires as to the allocation of EU and Member State competence, exposes
legal/Treaty stresses and political/institutional tensions which might otherwise
lie dormant. Institution-building can also be associated with re-settings of the
balance of power between the EU and the Member States, and between the EU
institutions, with respect to financial governance, given the centralizing effects
associated with the institutions of EU financial governance.30
Thus, and to take the example of determinative institutional tensions (and of
related Treaty constraints), in the early days of modern EU financial market
regulation, over the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EU struggled to adopt an
institutional solution to the problems raised by the absence of a nimble,
administrative rule-making process for financial governance, given the diffi-
culties generated by Council control over the ‘comitology’ process for ad-
ministrative rule-making.31 The subsequent ‘Lamfalussy’ committees, estab-
lished to support Commission financial administrative rule-making and a
defining feature of the pre-crisis and liberalizing era (1999–2008), were
broadly supported, politically, by the Member States. But their construction
exposed the extent of the wider institutional and constitutional difficulties
posed by the EU’s struggle at the time to achieve a compromise between the
Parliament and the Council in relation to oversight of administrative rule-
making generally. And, to take another example, while the Lisbon Treaty
2010), and, from a legal perspective, Moloney, N, EU Securities and Financial Markets
Regulation (3 edn OUP, Oxford 2014) and E Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market
(CUP, Cambridge 2004).
30 With respect to banking governance and the effects of Banking Union see E Ferran,
‘European Banking Union: Imperfect, But It Can Work’ in D Busch and G Ferrarini
(eds), European Banking Union (OUP, Oxford 2015) 56.
31 Examples include the failure to establish a ‘Securities Committee’ which would have
supported Commission rule-making under the 1993 Investment Services Directive
(Council Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field OJ [1993]
L141/27).
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reforms to the administrative rule-making process facilitated the construc-
tion of the ESAs in 2011, the decisive influence on their quasi-rule-making
functions has been the Meroni ruling,32 which limits the extent to which
agencies can exercise discretion and so prohibits rule-making by EU agencies
such as the ESAs but which has led to some tensions between the Commis-
sion, Parliament, and the ESAs with respect to the development of admin-
istrative rules.33
Institution-building has also exposed major political tensions between the
Member States, in particular with respect to the extent to which risks should
be mutualized and managed at EU level. The ‘fiscal redline’ drawn by certain
Member States was among the factors which led to the ESAs being prevented
from taking discretionary supervisory decisions which potentially carry fiscal
costs for the Member States.34 Although Banking Union is, by contrast,
designed to mutualize risk and fiscal costs, the manner and speed of risk
mutualization within Banking Union’s Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)
proved a major obstacle to agreement on the SRM.35 Increasingly, political
tensions arising from EU financial governance are a product of the relation-
ship between euro area/Banking Union governance and that of the non-euro-
area, and of the risk that Banking Union/euro-area caucusing could over-ride
the interests of non-euro-area Member States with respect to the governance
of the wider single market. The 18–19 February 2016 New Settlement for the
UK within the EU36 represents an attempt to ameliorate these tensions and to
clarify the relationship between both spheres of financial governance.
The New Settlement is designed to address the UK’s concern, fuelled by
Banking Union and the increasing influence of the ECB,37 that euro-area
caucusing could lead to euro-area dominance of single market decision-mak-
32 Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1957–1958] ECR 133.
33 See further Moloney (n 29) ch X. A limited number of discretionary supervisory powers
are conferred on ESMA, but these powers are typically tightly confined.
34 See further Moloney (n 29) ch XI and A Spendzharova, ‘Is More ‘Brussels’ the Solution?
New European Union Member States’ Preferences about the European Financial Ar-
chitecture’ (2012) 50 JCMS 315.
35 For discussion see: K Alexander, ‘A Legal and Institutional Analysis of the Single
Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism’ (2015) 40 ELRev 154;
Ferran (n 30); N Moloney, ‘European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resil-
ience’ (2014) 51(6) CMLRev 1609; and B Wolfers and T Vorland, ‘Level the Playing
Field: the New Supervision of Credit Institutions by the European Central Bank’ (2014)
51(5) CMLRev 1463.
36 N 7.
37 Notably following the ECB’s adoption of a location policy for central clearing counter-
parties (CCPs) which required such CCPs to be located in the euro area. The policy was
successfully challenged by the UK before the General Court of the EU: Case T-496/11
UK v European Central Bank, 4 May 2015.
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ing on financial governance. The New Settlement is also, however, designed to
reflect the concerns of euro-area Member States, and particularly France, that
the UK not be empowered to veto EU financial governance measures or be
given special treatment for its financial institutions.38 The New Settlement
contains a set of principles which are designed to affirm that while the euro
area can engage in deeper integration to complete EMU, the co-existence of
the euro area and of the single market must be acknowledged and protected.
Among the principles adopted are affirmations that: the harmonized single
rule-book which governs the EU financial system may, within Banking
Union, ‘need to be conceived in a more uniform manner’ and that a degree
of implementation discretion outside Banking Union is accordingly permit-
ted; and that the implementation by non-euro-area Member States of measures
for the purpose of preserving financial stability, and including measures relat-
ing to the supervision and resolution of financial institutions and markets, is a
‘matter for their own authorities and own budgetary responsibilities.’39 Ac-
cordingly, single-market-wide centralization of supervisory governance and
related institution-building can, politically at least,40 be resisted by the UK on
financial stability grounds.
Further strains follow from the pressure which institution-building places on
the Treaties. Article 114 TFEU – the competence workhorse of EU financial
governance – has proved to be something of a rickety basis for the ESFS/ESA
reforms and for the SRM within Banking Union.41 The Court of Justice of the
EU in the 2014 Short Selling ruling declined to follow the argument of the
Advocate General that Article 114 did not support the construction of an ‘EU
level decision-making mechanism’ and that certain of ESMA’s direct super-
visory powers were accordingly invalid.42 But the resilience of Article 114 as a
basis for institution-building remains in doubt, and a full challenge to Ar-
ticle 114 as the foundation for the ESAs has yet to be made and may follow,
if tensions as to the nature of institutional governance persist. The ESAs and
the SRM have also struggled with the constraints which the Meroni ruling on
the Treaty balance of institutional power imposes on their ability to take
38 As was well-documented during the New Settlement negotiations: eg, A Barker and G
Parker, ‘Cameron ‘in good place’ for Brussels deal’, Financial Times, 18 February 2016.
39 N 7, Annex 1, Section A, Economic Governance, paras 2 and 4.
40 The legal status of the New Settlement remains contested. It is designed to be ‘an
instrument for the interpretation of the Treaties’ but whether it is binding on the
EU’s courts is not clear.
41 See, eg, M Scholten and M Van Rijsbergen, ‘The ESMA Short Selling Case. Erecting a
New Delegation Doctrine for the EU upon the Meroni-Romano Remnants’ (2014) 41
LIEI 289 and M Chamon, ‘The Empowerment of Agencies under the Meroni Doctrine
and Art. 114 TFEU: Comment on the UK v Parliament and Council (Short Selling) and
the Proposed Single Resolution Mechanism’ (2014) 39 ELRev 380.
42 Case C-270/12 UK v Council and Parliament, 22 January 2014.
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discretionary decisions. Elsewhere, the Treaty pre-eminence of the ECB Gov-
erning Council (euro area members) has led to design difficulties with the
SSM, given that the SSM (and Banking Union) is open to non-euro-area
Member States.43
Legal and cognate scholarship has sought to identify and understand these
complex institutional, political, and constitutional forces and constraints and
how they shape institutional governance for the EU financial system. Legal
inquiry has addressed, for example, how the ESAs, as administrative actors,
achieve outcomes through the legal tools at their disposal, and has considered
their place within and the constraints imposed on them by the EU’s constitu-
tional order.44 Institutional governance questions have also long been a major
concern for the political economy and political science scholars who have
charted the forces which have shaped the single financial system and its under-
pinning governance structures.45 As the EU’s institutional structures for fi-
nancial governance have developed, close attention has focused on the inter-
play between the different intergovernmental forces which have long shaped
EU financial governance – and which are shaped in turn by the powerful
influences exerted by different underpinning institutional economic models46
– and on the nascent forces exerted by the preferences of the new adminis-
trative actors of financial governance.47 More recently, and over the crisis era,
the important notion of the EU’s ‘regulatory capacity’48 as an influence on
43 Ferran (n 30).
44 See, eg, Moloney (n 29) 854–1009, Busuioc (n 10), and P Schammo, ‘The European
Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the Veil on the Allocation of Powers’
(2011) 48(6) CMLRev 1879.
45 For reviews see D Mügge, ‘The Political Economy of Europeanized Financial Regu-
lation’ (2013) 20(3) Journal of European Public Policy 458 and L Quaglia, ‘The ‘Old’
and ‘New’ Politics of Financial Services Regulation in the EU’ (2012) 17(4) New Polit-
ical Economy 515.
46 For the seminal account (classifying national economies as broadly bank-based (Coor-
dinated Market Economies) or market-based (Liberal Market Economies)) see P Hall
and D Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Compa-
rative Advantage (OUP, Oxford 2001). For more recent considerations which reflect
how banking and market financing structures are increasingly becoming intertwined
and blurring the bank/market classification see, eg: I Hardie, and D Howarth, (eds),
Market-based Banking and the International Financial Crisis (OUP, Oxford 2013).
47 See, eg, E Posner, ‘Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Coop-
eration at the Turn of the Millennium’ (2009) 63(4) International Organization 665 and
D Coen and M Thatcher, ‘Network Governance and Multilevel Delegation: European
Networks of Regulatory Agencies’ (2008) 28 Journal of Public Policy 49.
48 In the political economy literature, ‘regulatory capacity’ is typically associated with the
ability of a state to formulate, monitor, and enforce rules: D Bach and A Newman, ‘The
European Regulatory State and Global Public Policy: Micro-institutions, Macro-influ-
ence’ (2007) 14(6) Journal of European Public Policy 827.
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how institutional governance has developed has come to the fore. This concept
has proved to have considerable explanatory power as the influence of admin-
istrative agencies, key drivers of regulatory capacity, on the design of institu-
tional governance (whether at domestic, regional, or international levels) has
become clearer.49
Legalanalysis accordinglyexposes therules-based constraintswhichshapehow
institutional governance develops, and political economy explains and offers
predictions as to the type of actor whose preferences shape institutional gover-
nance. Regulatory governance theory can shed additional light on the process
through and speed at which institutional governance reforms emerge and, in
particular, on the nature of incrementalism, dynamism, and momentum in this
area.50 The ‘experimentalist governance’ strand of EU governance theory has
proved to be particularly useful in explaining and predicting how administrative
agencies in the EU develop. Experimentalist governance51 identifies as exper-
imentalist those governance arrangements which supplement (or displace) the
traditional ‘command and control’ model of EU governance which has long
been based on binding legal rules set through the institutional/political process.
Experimentalist governance, by contrast, is based on the setting of general
framework goals (by, for example, the EU’s co-legislators, the Parliament and
Council, through legislative rules) and, in addition, on the related deployment –
at lower levels of governance (such as the ESAs) and with a degree of flexibility
and discretion – of different forms of implementing rules, of monitoring devices
(including peer review), and of mechanisms for revising goals and rules.52 Ex-
perimentalist governance predicts that administrative agencies, such as the
ESAs, can – outside the political process – deploy the legal and other tools at
their disposal to drive governance change, but in a fluid, iterative, and exper-
imental manner which is responsive to changes in their operating environments.
Experimentalist governance has proved to be a powerful tool for explaining
49 Eg, T Büthe and W Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in
the World Economy (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2011) and E Tsingou, ‘Reg-
ulatory Reaction to the Global Credit Crisis: Analyzing a Policy Community under
Stress’ in E Helleiner, S Pagliari, and H Zimmerman, (eds), Global Finance in Crisis. The
Politics of International Regulatory Change (Routledge, Oxford 2010) 21.
50 For a recent account of the dominant theoretical perspectives on EU agency governance
see M Egeberg, J Trondal, and N Vestlund, ‘The Quest for Order: Unravelling the
Relationship Between the European Commission and European Agencies’ (2015)
22(5) Journal of European Public Policy 609.
51 See J Zeitlin (ed), Extending Experimentalist Governance? The EU and Transnational
Regulation (OUP, Oxford 2015) and C Sabel and J Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Gov-
ernance in the European Union. Towards a New Architecture (OUP, Oxford 2010).
52 As identified by Sabel and Zeitlin: ‘Learning from Difference: the New Architecture of
Experimentalist Governance in the EU’, in ibid, 1, 2–3.
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how the ESAs can shape regulatory and supervisory governance and, thereby,
incrementally change institutional governance.53
Drawing on these insights, this article suggests that ESMA – the key admin-
istrative actor in EU capital market governance – is likely to be the primary
influence on how institutional governance for the single capital market devel-
ops over the CMU agenda period. Member State interests will determine
whether a major re-setting change in the form of the construction of central-
ized institutional structures for a euro-area-located ‘Financial Union’ will
occur, but a ‘big bang’ change of this order is unlikely. ESMA-shaped changes
to institutional governance are likely to be incremental and experimentalist in
nature but to have potentially significant centralization effects over time.
Whether or not, from a functional perspective, the institutional governance
solution which emerges will be optimal is not, for the moment, clear.
II. Institutional Governance and the EU Capital Market
1. The ESFS and the EU Capital Market
The institutional governance structure which supports the EU capital market
is currently situated within the European System of Financial Supervision
(ESFS), established in 2011, which is composed of: the Member States’ na-
tional competent authorities (NCAs), which provide the foundations of the
system; the three sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which
are charged with a range of quasi-regulatory and supervisory/supervisory
co-ordination functions – the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and their co-ordinating Joint
Committee; and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is charged
with monitoring pan-EU system-wide risks and macro-prudential stability.
Of the three ESAs, ESMA has primary competence with respect to capital
markets, although on a range of matters (including, for example, packaged
investment products which cross regulatory sectors and shadow banking) it
coordinates with its sister EBA and EIOPA authorities.
53 For an experimentalist analysis of EU financial governance from the perspective of EBA
see Ferran (n 10) and, for a pre-crisis view, see E Posner, ‘The Lamfalussy Process:
Polyarchic Origins of Networked Financial Rule-making in the EU’ in Sabel and Zeitlin
(n 51) 43. From the perspective of international governance and the EU’s engagement,
see M Campbell-Verduyn and T Porter, ‘Experimentalism in European Union and
Global Financial Governance: interactions, contrasts, and implications’ (2014) 21(3)
Journal of European Public Policy 408.
ECFR 2/2016 Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union 389
 - 10.1515/ecfr-2016-0376
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/01/2016 03:49:54PM
via London School of Economics and Political Science
The ESAs take the form of independent EU agencies, funded – for the moment
at least – by a combination of EU and Member State funds. Decision-making is
the prerogative of their respective Boards of Supervisors, which are largely
intergovernmental in nature, being primarily composed of the relevant NCAs
who alone exercise voting power. The ESAs’ powers are delegated or con-
ferred and are tightly enumerated, reflecting the constraints which apply to
agencies under the EU’s constitutional arrangements. With respect to regula-
tory governance, while legislative (‘level 1’) rule-making for the EU financial
system is the prerogative of the European Parliament and Council and, with
respect to administrative (‘level 2’) rule-making, the Commission, the ESAs
propose certain forms of administrative rule (‘Binding Technical Standards’) to
be adopted by the Commission, and also provide the Commission with ‘Tech-
nical Advice’ on administrative rule-making generally. The ESAs can in addi-
tion adopt an array of soft law, notably ‘Guidelines’ in relation to which
NCAs can be required to ‘comply or explain.’54
Supervisory governance remains at Member State level with NCAs. But the
ESAs have been conferred with: a range of supervisory co-ordination and
convergence powers, including data collection and peer review powers, the
power to review certain national supervisory decisions, and powers in relation
to participation in colleges of supervisors; a limited range of powers to direct
NCAs in specified circumstances (breach of EU law; emergency conditions;
and in binding mediation situations); and, in the case of ESMA, specified direct
powers of supervision over an ill-assorted group of capital market participants
and activities.55 These latter and more interventionist and hierarchically supe-
rior powers have been conferred incrementally, without overall coherence,
and following difficult political negotiations, and apply with respect to credit
rating agencies (exclusive ESMA supervision); OTC derivatives market trade
repositories (exclusive ESMA supervision); short selling (specified ESMA in-
tervention powers); the prohibition of investment products (specified ESMA
intervention powers); and the oversight of positions in commodity derivative
markets (specified ESMA intervention powers).
Accordingly, within the ESFS, the institutional governance of the EU capital
market is currently shared between the NCAs and ESMA is the primary EU-
level actor. The ESRB, however, provides a horizon-scanning role56 and sup-
54 Eg, Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Au-
thority) [2010] OJ L331/84, art16.
55 Under MiFID II/MiFIR EBA will additionally have intervention powers over struc-
tured deposits.
56 Eg, ESRB, ‘Assessing Contagion Risk from the CDS Market’ Occasional Paper No. 4, 4
September 2013.
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ports ESMA’s quasi-rule-making activities,57 while the cross-sector nature of
many capital market activities requires coordination between ESMA and
EBA/EIOPA through the ESA Joint Committee.
The current institutional governance structure for the EU capital market sits,
for the most part, outside the Banking Union structures (the Single Super-
visory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)). Only
deposit-taking entities come within the SSM. Investment firms are expressly
excluded from the scope of the SSM,58 as is conduct supervision59 – the main-
stay of capital markets supervision. There are, however, ‘grey zones’ in rela-
tion to SSM supervision where prudential/banking supervision and conduct/
capital market supervision competences may collide.
These include the treatment of conduct risk, which is primarily a concern for
capital markets supervisors, but which can also, depending on its nature, gen-
erate prudential risks to the stability of a bank.60 The SSM is empowered only
with respect to the risks associated with prudential supervision (2013 ECB/
SSM Regulation, Article 1) – as it must be given the nature of the Treaty com-
petence (Article 126(7) TFEU) which supports the SSM and which covers
prudential matters only. The need for careful co-ordination between the
EU’s capital market institutional governance structures and Banking Union’s
SSM is considerable, however, as the borderline between traditional conduct
supervision (located with NCAs/ESMA) and prudential supervision (located
with the ECB/SSM/EBA) is not always clearly marked with respect to the
supervisory treatment of different classes of conduct risk.61 In the investment
services field, for example, the 2004 MiFID I62 generated confusion as to when
particular supervisory activities came within the ‘conduct’ field and so within
57 It was closely engaged with the development of level 2 rules under EMIR, eg, which
requires that ESMA consult the ESRB in particular cases.
58 The SSM applies only to euro area ‘credit institutions’ as defined under the 2013 CRR
(in effect, deposit-taking institutions) and investment firms are expressly excluded:
Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concern-
ing policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L287/
63 (2013 ECB/SSM Regulation, arts 1 and 2(3). Recital 28, eg, notes that national author-
ities remain responsible for supervisory actions in relation to markets in financial instru-
ments.
59 Eg, 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation, art 4(1).
60 Conduct risk is increasingly a concern for prudential supervisors. See recently ESRB,
‘Report on Misconduct Risks in the Banking Sector’ 5 June 2015.
61 In the UK, eg, co-operation between the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) is governed by a detailed and complex set of
legislative and operational requirements, although the PRA ultimately can deploy a veto
power over FCA activities in particular circumstances.
62 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on markets in
financial instruments [2004] OJ L145/1.
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the competence of the investment firm branch host NCA (under MiFID I
Article 32(7)). The need for co-ordination is acknowledged in Article 3(1) of
the 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation which provides for the ECB to enter into
Memoranda of Understanding with NCAs ‘responsible for markets in finan-
cial instruments’.63 The extent of the potential for coordination difficulties is
likely to emerge soon. Under an important set of recent EBA Guidelines on
bank supervision, conduct risk is to be assessed (prudentially) by EU banking
supervisors, including SSM banking supervisors (which include the ECB
which has oversight of the SSM and is directly responsible for the supervision
of some 130 banking groups), under the Supervisory Review and Evaluation
Process (SREP) required under the EU banking rule-book (CRD IV/CRR).64
Other indicators of potential coordination difficulties can be identified. The
ECB, acting in a non-SSM capacity, has recently shown some concern, in its
policy and research activities, to adopt a wide approach to the definition of
shadow banks and to draw in asset managers, although asset managers have
traditionally been the concern of and supervised by capital market supervi-
sors.65 While ECB reporting and policy measures of this nature cannot over-
ride the Treaty restrictions on the specific prudential supervisory powers
which the ECB within the SSM can exercise, the possibilities for institutional
clashes within the ESFS with respect to softer policy measures relating to the
capital markets cannot be dismissed.
Accordingly, and as discussed in section V, ESMA/ECB dynamics are also
likely to play a part in determining how the current institutional settlement
for the EU capital market develops.
2. ESMA, the EU Capital Market, and the CMU Agenda
ESMA, in the five years since its 2011 foundation, has established itself as a
technocratic authority with considerable market, institutional, and political
credibility, as evidenced by a series of positive reviews from, for example, the
Commission, the Parliament, and the IMF.66 Its regulatory and supervisory
governance activities are considered further in sections IV and V.
63 Similarly, recital 33 to the 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation calls for MoUs between the ECB
and NCAs for markets in financial instruments which describe how these actors will co-
operate in their performance of supervisory tasks.
64 EBA, ‘Guidelines on Common Procedures and Methodologies for the Supervisory
Review and Evaluation Process’ EBA/GL/2014/13 (2014), paras 253–257, requiring
SREP supervisory review of conduct risk, including with respect to mis-selling and
conflict of interest failures.
65 ECB, ‘Report on Financial Structures’ 29 October 2015.
66 Commission (n 26); European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the European System of Fi-
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Institutionally, ESMA’s relations with the co-legislators and the Commission
appear, broadly, stable (although, as outlined later in this discussion, there are
some indications of growing tensions in its relations with the Commission and
European Parliament), and there appears to be little institutional appetite for
material changes to ESMA’s powers. The Commission did not, following the
2013-2014 ESFS Review, propose major changes to the ESAs/ESMA, confin-
ing its reform agenda to a range of more or less technical issues, including:
governance reforms (including the conferral of voting power on the ESA
Chairpersons); clarification of the ESA binding mediation power (discussed
in section V below); and, most controversially, a move to an industry-based
funding model.67 It is unlikely that radical proposals for change will follow in
the related reform proposals, expected in mid 2016. There are also few indi-
cations of an institutional or political appetite to use the CMU agenda to
change the current ESMA-based settlement for EU capital market institution-
al governance. The Commission’s September 2016 Action Plan touches only
tentatively on institutional governance matters, calling only for ESMA’s super-
visory convergence activities to be strengthened.68 The European Parliament,
as discussed in section V, appears increasingly sensitive to accretions of power
by the ESAs, further reducing the likelihood of institutionally-driven change.
Politically, the European Council has endorsed the Commission’s minimalist
approach, ‘emphasizing’ in its November 2015 Resolution on CMU the Com-
mission’s conclusion that the CMU agenda can be taken forward within the
existing mandates of the ESAs, although also calling for a strengthening of
supervisory convergence.69
But it is unlikely that the CMU agenda will not have any implications for the
institutional governance of the EU capital market generally or for ESMA in
particular. The CMU agenda is likely to have one of three effects on ESMA.
First, the CMU agenda may destabilize and disrupt the current evolutionary
and experimentalist trajectory of EU capital market institutional governance if
it leads to or comes to operate within changed political conditions which
support further institutional centralization. Second, the CMU agenda may
strengthen ESMA, and reinforce its position as the pre-eminent EU markets
authority, by supporting the current incremental and experimentalist develop-
ment of ESMA and by creating conducive conditions for ESMA’s evolution.
Third, the CMU agenda may slow the current evolutionary process by ob-
structing the adoption of necessary supportive reforms.
nancial Supervision Review’ A7-0133/2014, 9 March 2014; and IMF, ‘Financial Sector
Assessment Program, European Union. European Securities and Markets Authority’
(Technical Note) March 2013
67 N 26.
68 Action Plan (n 3) 26–27.
69 N 8.
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The second and third outcomes, which assume that ESMA’s influence, as an
administrative actor, is determinative, can be predicted with a degree of cer-
tainty. Recent evidence of ESMA’s preferences and of the means through
which it exerts influence suggests that ESMA is likely to strengthen its soft
governance powers over the EU capital market (within or without the CMU
agenda) and to increase its influence on EU capital market governance in an
incremental and experimentalist manner. ESMA’s 2016–2020 ‘Strategic Orien-
tation’ is indicative. It suggests an ESMA determination to set its own prior-
ities as its focus shifts to rule implementation and to the support of supervisory
convergence.70 Sections IV and V consider ESMA’s activities and preferences,
how they are likely to shape institutional governance for the EU capital mar-
ket, and how the CMU agenda may accelerate or disrupt ESMA’s current
institutional trajectory.
The first and more radical outcome, which assumes that the Member States are
the determinative influence, is only likely if the CMU agenda leads to, or
operates within, political conditions which are supportive of stronger central-
ization of institutional governance for the EU capital market. Absent a reset-
ting shock to the EU capital market, on the lines of the banking and subse-
quent euro-area crises which changed institutional and political conditions
such that the ESFS and subsequently Banking Union could be constructed
and the related constitutional obstacles surmounted, this is unlikely. Proxi-
mate causes for an agenda-changing crisis in the EU capital market can easily
be identified (a severe liquidity crisis,71 perhaps following the failure of a CCP,
being the most likely). But the dense rule-book now supporting the EU capital
market and the increasing levels of surveillance, including by prudential super-
visors, over capital markets,72 reduce, at least, the likelihood of a re-setting
catastrophic crisis. There is, however, another location for re-setting change: a
euro-area-located Financial Union with centralized institutional structures, as
discussed in section III.
70 ESMA, ‘Strategic Orientation 2016 – 2020’ ESMA/2015/935 (2015).
71 Liquidity risks are currently a major preoccupation of regulators globally and of the
market, given increasing concerns as to thinning and fragile liquidity, particularly in the
bond markets. See, eg, the IMF’s 2015 ‘Global Financial Stability Reports’ (April and
September 2015 and April 2016), and an October 2015 speech by Bank of England
Deputy Governor Shafik on ‘Dealing with Change: Liquidity in Evolving Market
Structures’, 27 October 2015. From a markets perspective see, eg, ICMA, ‘European
Repo Market Survey’, September 2015.
72 Including globally through the FSB’s current capital market initiatives, particularly with
respect to shadow banking (eg FSB, ‘Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report’ 12
November 2015) and, within the EU, through ESMA and the ECB (through the latter’s
‘Financial Stability Reviews’).
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III. CMU and Institution Building: CMU and/or Financial Union?
1. CMU and Financial Union
CMU is, on the face of it, primarily concerned with market construction and
with the single market in capital.73 But it is also strongly associated with the
reinforcement of the single market against the fragmentation risks inherent in
Banking Union (predominantly a euro-area construct), and, in particular,
against the risks posed to the single market by euro-area caucusing within
Banking Union. More specifically, the potential for ‘Brexit’ casts a long shad-
ow over the CMU project. The UK’s concerns as to the potential for euro-area
caucusing and for related discrimination against single market Member States
who do not form part of the euro area were given clear legal expression recently
by the successful action by the UK against the ECB’s clearing policy (which the
UK claimed discriminated against non-euro-area central clearing counterpar-
ties (CCPs))74 and by the declarations in the 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR that Mem-
ber States not be discriminated against on currency grounds.75 A similar infer-
ence can be drawn from the July 2015 Joint Council and Commission
Declaration, sought by the UK, that the European Financial Stability Mech-
anism cannot impose a liability on a non-euro-area Member State with respect
to financial assistance to a euro area Member State.76 The distinct UK concerns
as to the potential for Banking-Union-generated forces to reshape governance
for the single financial market were clear from the outset of the Banking Union
negotiations. The ‘double lock’ voting arrangement which now applies to the
EBA Board of Supervisors and which requires a double majority of Banking
Union Board members and non Banking Union Board members77 were driven
73 Eg Green Paper (n 2), underlining that the objective is a ‘Capital Markets Union for all
28 Member States’ (at 2), and Action Plan (n 3), emphasizing that CMU is designed to
‘build a true single market for capital – a Capital Markets Union’ and that economies
with under-developed capital markets should benefit from CMU (at 3). The College of
Commissioners has emphasized that ‘CMU is a classical single market project, which
should be created by the 28 Member States, for the 28’: Commission Press Release,
28 January 2015.
74 Case T-496/11, European Central Bank v UK, 4 May 2015. The General Court of the
EU did not address the discrimination question but ruled against the ECB for lack of
competence to adopt its policy.
75 In a legally redundant but politically significant recital MiFID II affirms that no action
taken by ESMA or an NCA should directly or indirectly discriminate against any
Member States as a venue for the provisions or investment services and activities in
any currency (recital 139).
76 Council Press Release No. 593/15, 17 July 2015.
77 The reforms were adopted in Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 as regards the
ECFR 2/2016 Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union 395
 - 10.1515/ecfr-2016-0376
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/01/2016 03:49:54PM
via London School of Economics and Political Science
by the UK, while the Bank of England has warned of the risks to the UK from
euro-area caucusing.78
The February 2016 New Settlement (outlined in section I above) is designed to
give legal and political protection to the UK against euro-area caucusing risks
and is the European Council’s response to the UK’s call for legally binding
principles ‘that safeguard the operation of the Union for all 28 Member States’
and which include recognition that the single market must be protected.79 The
CMU agenda provides another means, however, through which the primacy
and integrity of the single market can be asserted. It is hard to avoid the
inference that CMU is, in many respects, an expedient EU agenda, allowing
the EU to underline the importance of the single market in an area of partic-
ular economic importance to the City of London. It is not unreasonable,
accordingly, to speculate that the CMU agenda, of itself, is unlikely to lead
to radical change to the current institutional settlement for the single capital
market.
But another interpretation of the CMU agenda is possible. The important June
2015 Five Presidents’ Report on EMU saw the Five Presidents ‘borrow’ CMU
and characterize it as a device for completing EMU.80 The Report calls for an
‘Economic Union’ and (in the more long-term) a ‘Fiscal Union’ to complete
EMU, and sets out high-level reform proposals and time-lines in this regard.
But it also calls for a ‘Financial Union’ and highlights that ‘Economic and
Financial Union are complementary and mutually reinforcing. . ..Progress on
these two fronts must be a top priority.’81 It is not clear at present what a
‘Financial Union’ might entail. The Report suggests that it could incorporate
Banking Union and its structures. But it also suggests that a Financial Union
could in addition incorporate CMU in order to diversify risks across countries
within EMU, moderate the impact of cross-country shocks, and ensure that
monetary policy decisions are transmitted across EMU.82 Political and policy
reaction to the Report has been muted, perhaps reflecting the political sensi-
tivities and the very significant constitutional and institutional complexities
associated with institutional reform (noted below). ECB President Draghi has,
however, been clear in his support for the centralization of governance within
conferral of specific powers on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L287/63.
78 Bank of England, ‘EU Membership and the Bank of England’ 21 October 2015, 6–7.
79 Letter from UK Prime Minister Cameron to European Council Chair Tusk, 10 No-
vember 2015, 2.
80 ’Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Report by Jean-Claude Juncker,
in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi, and Martin
Schulz’ June 2015, 12.
81 At 11.
82 Ibid.
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the euro area, although he has also been careful not to call directly for a
centralization of capital market governance structures.83 And while the Com-
mission and European Council have emphasized the single market function of
CMU, they have both underlined the benefits of CMU in terms of supporting
the smooth transmission of monetary policy within the euro area.84 The pros-
pect of a Financial Union emerging cannot accordingly be lightly dismissed.
2. Centralizing Capital Market Governance within a Financial Union?
It is not clear whether any euro area Financial Union incorporating CMU
would imply the mutualization of supervisory risks and costs, and so require a
centralized supervision structure and related resolution mechanisms, mirror-
ing Banking Union. The risk diversification required for EMU, and which
would support financial stability within the euro area, could well be achieved
through a well-functioning single market. But the delicate institutional over-
tures on Financial Union which are currently being played, and the link being
made between the CMU agenda and support of euro area stability, suggest that
it is not entirely unreasonable to suggest that CMU, if it becomes tied to
Financial Union, may lead to institutional change for the euro area capital
market. It may be that the CMU agenda, if political conditions allow, produces
a multi-layered institutional governance model, composed of concentric gov-
ernance circles, with an inner layer composed of discrete institutions for a euro
area Financial Union and an outer layer composed of the current structures
operating on a pan-EU basis for a single-market-based CMU. It is hard, in this
regard, to ignore the ECB’s statement that while ‘CMU is first and foremost an
EU-28 agenda,’ enhanced cooperation in other ways could be explored, and
that a ‘vanguard group’ of countries could proceed on the basis of ‘enhanced
cooperation’ and its view that ‘the roadmap towards a genuine CMU. . .should
thus include a single capital markets supervisor.’85
The ECB’s stance is not entirely surprising, even leaving aside the ECB’s
institutional incentives to claim the Financial Union/CMU agenda. The evo-
83 In a 2015 speech (‘Cross-border Markets and Common Governance’, Bank of England
Open Forum, 11 November 2015, London) ECB President Draghi argued that ‘[f]or
countries that share a single currency and a single market, therefore, the case is clear – I
would say almost undeniable – for stronger common governance and deeper institu-
tional integration.’ Although the comments relate to the need to complete Banking
Union, they chime with the Five Presidents’ Report.
84 Action Plan (n 3), 3 noting the ability of CMU to support better shock absorption
within the euro area, and European Council Resolution (n 8) para 4, noting CMU as
a project of ‘shared importance’ for the EU-28 and as a priority for completing EMU.
85 ECB (n 8).
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lution of EU institutional governance for the financial system has a strongly
incremental quality. Institutional design reforms, while often radical in terms
of their legacy effects, are typically based on a reshaping of ‘off the shelf’
models. These models are typically dusted down and recast when political
and market conditions provide the impetus for the political compromises
and for the legal sleights of hand which are typically required of new gover-
nance designs, and for the related rebalancing of competences between the EU
and its Member States. Thus, the ESAs are based on the ‘Lamfalussy commit-
tee’ design model, and the SSM is situated within the ECB, although in each
case ingenious legal solutions and political compromises were required to
adapt the existing constructs to the new institutional structures. It is not there-
fore inconceivable that the ESA-, SRM-, and ECB/SSM-templates could be
deployed to construct a new form of institutional design for a euro-area Fi-
nancial Union which sits within a wider CMU. Incrementalism has, of course,
limits. CMU and Banking Union have different drivers. The Banking Union
reforms are primarily concerned with euro-area risk mutualization, the sup-
port of financial stability, and the protection of the euro; the CMU/Financial
Union agenda is concerned with risk diversification and single market liber-
alization. But the increasingly close focus by prudential supervisors globally
on the risks to financial stability posed by securities markets, and particularly
those risks posed by liquidity contractions, means that speculation as to the
wisdom and likelihood of some form of centralized supervision within a Fi-
nancial Union in order to support efficient risk diversification across the euro
area, and in the interests of euro-area financial stability, is not necessarily
misplaced.
This is all the more the case as the February 2016 New Settlement makes clear
that financial stability has become the new battleground for the holding of
territory with respect to euro area/non-euro area financial governance. While
the New Settlement affirms that implementing measures relating to supervision
and resolution, and with respect to markets and financial institutions, are the
province ofnon-euro-area Member States and their authorities, it also notes that
such Member States can ‘join common mechanisms open to their participa-
tion’:86 the implication that common supervisory and resolution mechanisms
for the euro area may develop is clear. There are, however, a number of powerful
braking factors – operational, constitutional, and political – which caution
against predictions that institutional structures to support mutualized super-
vision and rescue/resolution of euro-area capital market actors are likely to
appear.
The operational challenges alone compel a pause for thought. The single market
in capital is far from complete and the degree to which market-based funding is
86 N 7, Annex I, Section A, Economic Governance, para 4.
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reliedondifferssharplyacrosstheMemberStates, includingacrosstheeuroarea,
as has been repeatedly reported.87 There is also an immense diversity of actors in
the capital markets, ranging from non-financial issuers and counterparties
(NFCs), to multi-function systemically-significant global banks with capital
market operations, to systemically-significant financial market infrastructures.
The related need for nimble and appropriately differentiated supervision is be-
coming increasingly apparent. The importance of and the challenges raised by
proportionality mechanisms, for example, are becoming clear (section IV be-
low). To take another example, how best to calibrate capital market rules to
NFCs is increasingly drawing regulatory attention, as is whether such calibra-
tion is obscuring the potential for NFCs to generate systemic risk.88 The func-
tional logicofcentralized supervision isnotaccordinglystrongandthepotential
economies of scale are not compelling.
Any form of institutional centralization would in addition need to engage with
the importance of conduct supervision in the capital markets sphere. While
banking supervision is primarily concerned with prudential supervision and
related risk management tools, capital market supervision requires close over-
sight of a vast range of conduct risks, including with respect to market trans-
parency, efficiency, and integrity, and consumer protection. While prudential
supervision can rely to a significant extent on remote data collection and
monitoring, conduct supervision requires close contact with the day-to-day
operations of financial institutions. Centralization would pose significant
challenges.
It may be, of course, that any Financial Union would not be so ambitious and
would include only those capital market actors with systemic implications and
whose failure could disrupt the ability of the euro area to diversify risks: major
financial market infrastructures and global investment banks might be appro-
priate candidates. But here particular difficulties arise with respect to resolution
and rescue. The SRM does, of course, include certain major investment banks.89
87 Among the many recent discussions see, eg: Commission (EC), ‘Initial Reflections on
the Obstacles to the Development of Deep and Integrated EU Capital Markets’ (Staff
Working Document SWD (2015) 13, 18 February 2015); A Giovannini, C Mayer,
S Micossi, C Di Noia, M Onado, M Pagano, and A Polo, ‘Restarting European
Long-term Investment Finance. A Green Paper Discussion Document’ (CEPR, Brus-
sels 2015); and European Capital Markets Expert Group, ‘Europe’s Untapped Capital
Market. Rethinking Integration after the Great Financial Crisis’ (CEPS/ECMI, Brus-
sels 2016).
88 ESMA, eg, has recently raised concerns as to the divergences across the Member States
in how the calibrated rules which govern NFCs under EMIR are applied, and how
NFCs are defined: ESMA, ‘EMIR Review No. 1’ ESMA/2015/1251 (2015).
89 Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council estab-
lishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions
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But a specific regime would be required for the resolution of systemic infra-
structures, and here the political difficulties are likely to be significant given the
fiscal risks posed by CCPs in particular. The sensitivities posed by the coordi-
nation of CCP supervision under EMIR are already clear. EMIR requires that
CCPs, for the first time in the EU, be supervised through colleges of supervisors
and in accordance with the protocols and rule-book established under EMIR.90
ESMA’s first report on CCP college operation was broadly positive, but it
warned of coordination difficulties, and, in particular, of a reluctance by college
chairs in some instances to share information, which could disrupt college de-
cision-making.91 The design of a related resolution/rescue system, given the
potentially severe fiscal implications of a CCP default, is, accordingly, likely
to generate very significant political difficulties. Although the Commission
published its pathfinder Consultation in 201292 there has been little progress
since then. Informal consultations and impact assessment work is underway93
andtheCommissionhascommittedtoproducingaproposal94butprogresssofar
has been slow.
The constitutional obstacles are similarly significant. The Meroni doctrine
prevents any EU agency – such as ESMA, a variant thereof, or any new agency
for the euro area – from being granted the wide range of discretionary super-
visory powers which capital markets supervision demands. ESMA’s current
suite of direct supervisory powers is heavily confined by legislative and ad-
ministrative conditions (for example, the conditions which apply to exercise
of its new powers in relation to position oversight in the commodity deriva-
tive markets: MiFIR, Article 45) which would be difficult to apply in any
operationally sensible manner to a full-scale markets supervisor. The ECB
remains a candidate, certainly. Article 127(6) TFEU could support the transfer
of capital market supervision powers to the ECB and, as an EU institution
established under the Treaty, the ECB does not operate under the Meroni
constraint. But other difficulties arise, not least that Article 127(6), which
allows for supervisory powers to be conferred on the ECB, only addresses
prudential supervision and does not provide a competence in respect of con-
duct supervision.
and certain investment firms within the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism
and a Single Resolution Fund [2014] OJ L225/1, art 2(1)(c).
90 EMIR, arts 19–21.
91 ESMA, ‘ESMA Review of CCP Colleges under EMIR’ ESMA/2015/20 (2015).
92 Commission (EC), ‘Consultation on a Possible Recovery and Resolution Framework
for Financial Institutions other than Banks’, 5 October 2012.
93 Commission (EC), ‘Roadmap, Framework for Resolution of non-bank Financial In-
stitutions,’ April 2015.
94 CMU Green Paper (n 2) 23.
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An entirely new institution could be established under Article 352 TFEU. But
the UK’s opposition to centralized capital market supervision95 makes it po-
litically highly unlikely that a new institution would be constructed, as Ar-
ticle 352 requires a unanimous vote. Notwithstanding the political protections
contained in the New Settlement, the UK is likely to be reluctant to support
the construction of any new euro area institution under Article 352, even
though the New Settlement also ‘acknowledges’ that non-euro-area Member
States ‘will not create obstacles’ to the deepening of EMU.96
So where does this leave the institutional governance debate on the CMU
agenda and on the institutional settlement for the EU capital market? Current
political conditions and a host of braking factors suggest that the institutional
discussion should be framed by the single market context and, accordingly,
with reference to the current institutional structure supporting the single
market in capital. These conditions may, of course, change – particularly if
the CMU agenda proves to have significant transformative effects and if the
degree of capital market integration materially deepens, particularly within
the euro area;97 if a successful bedding in of the Banking Union reforms
strengthens the logic for some form of centralized euro area supervision;
and if the New Settlement comes to be regarded as providing robust protec-
tion for non-euro-area Member States. A multi-speed governance arrange-
ment may follow, with top-down centralized structures operating within the
euro area and along side bottom-up (coordination/ESMA-based) structures
for the single market more generally. Such an outcome would lead to the co-
existence of potentially competing institutional arrangements within a highly
complex institutional eco-system. But it might also provide an evolutionary
and pragmatic response to the lack of completion of both the single market and
of the euro area, and to the current political divergence across the EU as to the
merits of further integration, which is now crystallized within the New Set-
tlement.
The likelihood of any such institutional arrangement emerging must remain
remote, however, not least given the current political uncertainties relating to
‘Brexit’. The following sections accordingly consider how the current institu-
tional governance settlement for the EU capital market might develop, draw-
ing on ESMA’s preferences and activities as evidenced by recent empirical
experience. They suggest that an ESMA-driven, incremental, and experimen-
talist outcome, which leads to more centralization of regulatory and super-
visory governance, is most likely.
95 Bank of England, Response to the European Commission Green Paper: Building a
Capital Markets Union (2015) 2.
96 N 7, Annex I, Section A, Economic Governance, Introduction.
97 For a sceptical perspective see Moloney (n 9).
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IV. Regulatory Governance and the CMU Agenda
1. Regulatory Governance: the Institutional Settlement
There has been a marked centralization in the regulatory governance of the EU
capital market since the establishment of ESMA in 2011. This reflects the
political commitment at the ‘level 1’ legislative level to a detailed ‘single
rule-book’98 and to mandate the administrative process accordingly.99 But this
centralization also has an evolutionary and incremental quality, reflecting
ESMA’s influence as an administrative actor and its increasing regulatory ca-
pacity.
Since 2011 ESMA has produced a vast range of what might be termed ‘quasi-
regulatory products’ in the form of BTS proposals (at level 2), Technical
Advice (at level 2), and Guidelines and other soft measures (at level 3), through
which it has exerted a decisive influence on the single rule-book for the EU
capital market. In his September 2015 report to the Parliament’s ECON com-
mittee, for example, ESMA Chairman Maijoor reported on the adoption by
ESMA in the previous year of 65 extensive BTSs (primarily under MiFID II/
MiFIR, EMIR, and the Market Abuse Regulation) and 56 lengthy sets of
Technical Advice.100 In a number of cases, ESMA’s quasi-rule-making activities
have led to it exercising significant influence over the shape of the EU capital
market. Its BTS proposals on which derivative instruments must be cleared
through CCPs under the 2012 EMIR, for example, are reshaping the structure
of the EU derivatives market. A significant milestone was reached in August
2015 when the Commission endorsed ESMA’s first BTS imposing a CCP
clearing obligation – on certain interest rate swaps denominated in euro, ster-
ling, yen, and the US dollar.101 ESMA has also, through its quasi-regulatory
activities, established a single set of reporting standards for derivatives trans-
actions. ESMA Chair Maijoor has recently characterized these initiatives as
98 On level 1 law-making over the crisis period see, eg, L Quaglia, ‘Banking Union as
Holy Grail: Rebuilding the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s
Banks, and ‘Completing’ Economic and Monetary Union’ (2013) 51 JCMS 103 and
E Ferran, ‘After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the
EU’ (2011) 12 EBOLR 379. For a policy perspective, see House of Lords, European
Union Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2014–2015, ‘The Post-Crisis EU Regula-
tory Framework: do the pieces fit?’ (2015).
99 On the drivers of the EU’s commitment to a ‘single rule-book’ for the EU capital
market see Moloney (n 29) ch X and E Ferran, ‘Crisis-driven Regulatory Reform:
Where in the World is the EU Going?’ in E Ferran, N Moloney, J Hill, and C Coffee,
The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (CUP, Cambridge (2012)) 1.
100 ’Statement by ESMA Chairman Maijoor to the ECON Committee’ ESMA/2015/
1349, 14 September 2015.
101 C(2015) 5390.
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supporting an ‘OTC Derivatives Union’ within which there is a high level of
regulatory and supervisory consistency – and which could act as a model for
CMU.102 Similarly, ESMA’s highly granular, instrument-specific September
2015 BTS proposals for the massive new cross-asset-class transparency regime
under MiFID II/MiFiR are likely to have major implications not just for the
transparency of the EU capital market, but also for its liquidity, particularly in
the bond markets.103
There are few signs of this administratively-driven trajectory toward regula-
tory centralization flattening out. The immediate pressure to adopt new ad-
ministrative rules is receding, as is reflected in ESMA’s current focus on super-
visory convergence activities (section V). Nonetheless, the co-legislators are
still granting wide-ranging mandates for administrative rules104 and this can be
expected to continue over the CMU agenda period, as is clear from the pro-
posed securitization regime. In addition, ESMA’s appetite for shaping the
single rule-book through soft law measures appears to be considerable, in part
reflecting its incentives to reinforce its regulatory capacity as an administrative
actor and its position as the source of technocratic regulatory expertise in the
EU, and in part reflecting the complexities and ambiguities of the single rule-
book and industry and NCA needs for consistency and clarification. ESMA
has, since 2011, adopted a large suite of Guidelines (adopted under ESMA
Regulation Article 16 and subject to NCA ‘comply or explain’ requirements),
usually to support the consistent application of rules.105 Guidelines provide
ESMA with a powerful lever for centralizing regulatory governance as their
adoption is not dependent on a level 1 mandate and is not subject to the inter-
institutional oversight mechanisms which apply to Technical Advice and
BTSs. As discussed further below, ESMA is also proving itself adept in man-
aging the risks to its regulatory capacity which arise from the somewhat shaky
accountability and legitimacy controls on ESMA Guidance.
102 ESMA Chairman Maijoor, Speech on ‘Clearing the way towards an OTC derivatives
union’ ESMA/2015/1417, 22 September 2015.
103 ESMA, ‘Proposed Regulatory Technical Standards and Implementing Technical Stand-
ards MiFID II/MiFIR. Final Report’ ESMA/2015/1464 (2015).
104 Such as, eg, the mandates in the proposed Benchmark Regulation (Commission (EC),
‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on indices
used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts’ COM (2013) 141,
18 September 2013). The Regulation was agreed by the Council and Parliament on 25
November 2015.
105 Recent examples include its ‘Guidance on Commodity Derivatives’, ESMA/2015/675
(2015). See further Moloney (n 29) 929–935.
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Whether or not regulatory governance should continue to follow this central-
izing trajectory is not the subject of this discussion, although the scale of
political, industry, and institutional support for the single rule-book, recently
reinforced through the CMU agenda, suggests this debate is somewhat sterile.
From an institutional governance perspective, and specifically with reference
to the influence of administrative governance, stakeholder support for ESMA’s
role, and for the related centralization of regulatory governance through ad-
ministrative means, appears to be secure.106 In a significant political and in-
stitutional show of support for ESMA, there has been a marked movement
across the level 1 mandates for administrative rule-making from the use of
‘standard’ administrative level 2 rule-making (which is controlled by the
Commission and in relation to which ESMA provides Technical Advice) to
the use of BTSs (in relation to which ESMA proposes BTSs and benefits from a
range of procedural protections, although BTSs are adopted/endorsed by the
Commission). Certainly, ESMA’s position as a technocratic expert is being
reinforced. The important September 2015 BTS proposals issued by ESMA
on the MiFID II/MiFIR market microstructure rules,107 and ESMA’s extensive
September 2015 review of the EU credit rating agency industry,108 for example,
evidence the development of a sophisticated ESMA rule-design capacity, as
well as an extensive empirical and stakeholder consultation capacity.
Regulatory governance for the EU capital market can, accordingly, be ex-
pected to continue to centralize over the CMU agenda period, through admin-
istrative channels, and without formal institutional reforms. Nonetheless,
there are indications that stresses are emerging which may come to threaten
the ability of the EU to support the EU capital market by means of a robust
administrative regulatory process or, at least, which may lead to an adminis-
trative process which struggles to achieve outcomes in an optimal manner.
While there are counter indications that ESMA’s ability to generate refine-
ments informally and in a responsive and experimentalist manner is significant
and increasing, this ability is constrained by procedural formalities and by
Treaty restrictions. The CMU agenda may, however, distract the co-legislators
from necessary reforms. The following sections consider the nature of the
stresses on the administrative regulatory process and in light of the CMU
agenda.
106 See, eg, the discussions at n 66.
107 N 103.
108 ESMA, ‘Technical Advice, Competition, Choice, and Conflicts of Interest in the
Credit Rating Agency Industry’ ESMA/2015/1472 (2015).
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2. Institutional Tensions
The Commission and ESMA
Institutional tensions remain potentially significant with respect to level 2 rule-
making for the EU capital market, reflecting the strong incentives of the Com-
mission, in particular, but also of the European Parliament, to protect their
prerogatives in relation to administrative rule-making. There have been only a
few instances where the Commission has revised or vetoed BTSs proposed by
ESMA or not followed ESMA’s Technical Advice. But these episodes have typ-
ically generated some market consternation, given the extensive consultation
and impact assessment ESMA engages in and concerns as to the opacity of the
process through which the Commission adopts level 2 rules and BTSs and as to
the potential politicization of a process which is designed to be administrative
and technical. Shortly after ESMA’s establishment, the Commission did not
follow important elements of ESMA’s Technical Advice relating to the level 2
2013AlternativeInvestmentFundManagersDirective(AIFMD)Regulation,109
generating something of an industry fracas and concerns as to the injection of
political interests once the technical, ESMA-led process had completed. The
BTS process has also generated tensions between the Commission and ESMA.
The EMIR process, in particular, proved troublesome, leading on one occasion
to a sharp public exchange of views between the Commission and ESMA.110
A degree of tension between the Commission (the constitutional location of
administrative rule-making power) and ESMA (the location of technical ex-
pertise) is to be expected and can be productive where it leads to careful
attention to institutional mandates and powers and to useful mutual oversight.
But risks to good governance arise where institutional difficulties slow down
rule-making for the EU capital market or fetter ESMA as the location of
technical expertise. Given the Meroni restrictions, it is neither reasonable
nor realistic to call for ESMA to be empowered to act as an administrative
rule-maker. It is also increasingly clear that the level 2 process is organic and
dynamic and that both ESMA and the Commission are, reflecting the predic-
tions of experimentalist governance, engaged in an iterative and often con-
structive process to ensure the system operates as effectively as possible within
current constraints.
ESMA and the Commission have recently agreed, for example, on an ‘early
legal review’ process which is designed to ensure that legal mandate and other
difficulties which may obstruct the adoption by the Commission of an admin-
istrative rule proposed or advised by ESMA are flagged early on.111 Similarly,
109 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 231/2013 [2013] OJ L83/1.
110 Moloney (n 29) 920–921 and 926–927.
111 Letter to ESMA Chairman Maijoor to Director General Faull, 15 May 2015.
ECFR 2/2016 Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union 405
 - 10.1515/ecfr-2016-0376
Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/01/2016 03:49:54PM
via London School of Economics and Political Science
the Commission and ESMA can be regarded as forming something of an ‘axis
of technocracy’ which can generate pragmatic remedial solutions. The emer-
gence in November 2015 of a coordinated position between ESMA and the
Commission to the effect that a delay to the implementation date of MiFID II/
MiFIR be adopted given the complexities and costs of implementation reflects
not only a welcome pragmatism in the Commission’s and ESMA’s approach to
MiFID II/MiFIR, but also a productive degree of coordination.112
Ad hoc initiatives of this nature go some way to addressing the risks to effec-
tive rule-making which are generated by the current institutional governance
arrangements which support administrative rule-making for the EU capital
market. But the CMU agenda provides a moment when more formal and
stable reforms can be contemplated. Greater clarity is needed in level 1 man-
dates, for example, to avoid the risk of level 1 discussions being continued or
re-opened during the level 2 phase and thereby subverting the technical ad-
ministrative process. The potential for administrative inefficiencies must also
be removed. The nature of a Commission ‘revision’ to a proposed BTS, which
triggers a subsequent ESMA consultation and review process, should, for
example, be clearer. To take a final example, the process through which the
Commission adopts level 2 rules and BTSs should be significantly more trans-
parent, particularly where the Commission diverges from ESMA. The like-
lihood of the CMU agenda crowding out technical reforms of this nature,
however, is high.
The European Parliament and ESMA
The less documented but no less pivotal ESMA/European Parliament rela-
tionship (the Parliament, along with the Council, exercises veto powers over
Regulatory Technical Standards (RTSs) and has long been careful to protect
its prerogatives with respect to administrative rule-making), which was ini-
tially strong,113 appears to be experiencing some stresses, perhaps reflecting
ESMA’s growing authority and regulatory capacity as the EU’s capital mar-
kets agency.
112 The possibility of a delay was raised by ESMA Chairman Maijoor in his evidence on
MiFID II to the Parliament’s ECON committee (ECON Scrutiny Speech – MiFID 2,
ESMA/2015/1639, 10 November 2015)) and the Commission’s support was subse-
quently reported (J Brunsden and P Stafford, ‘EU overhaul of financial market rules
to be delayed’ Financial Times online, 10 November 2015). The co-legislators agreed to
the delay in May 2016.
113 As is clear from the ECON committee’s repeated support for the conferral of direct
supervisory powers on ESMA.
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The January 2016 Balz Resolution114 suggests some Parliament concern to
exert tighter control over ESMA. While broadly supportive of ESMA and
calling for ESMA to be closely engaged in the upcoming review crisis-era
measures, the Resolution called on ESMA and the Commission to ensure they
operate within the limits of their level 2 empowerments. The Resolution also
raised concerns as to the implications of the new ESMA/Commission infor-
mal ‘early legal review’ process for the Parliament’s oversight powers. It addi-
tionally called for more transparency over internal ESMA decision-making
and for the Parliament to be provided with early drafts of proposed BTSs and
Technical Advice.115 Despite is independence guarantee, ESMA already oper-
ates under significant institutional constraints, including the potential chilling
effect of Commission representation on its Board of Supervisors. The opening
of its internal deliberations to Parliament’s scrutiny could further and signifi-
cantly undermine its independence.
Parliamentary concern has also been generated with respect to ESMA’s soft
quasi-regulatory powers and particularly with respect to Guidelines. ESMA
Guidelines can generate constitutional conundrums as to their vires, legiti-
macy, and accountability, particularly where Guidelines are not closely related
to level 1 rules and as definitive interpretive authority over EU law lies not
with ESMA but with the Court of Justice of the EU. Legal certainty risks can
also arise, as arguably was the case where the NCAs of five major markets in
the EU chose not to comply with ESMA’s Guidelines on Short Selling.116
Guidelines were identified as a concern by the 2016 Balz Resolution which
called for less reliance on Guidelines, particularly where their adoption was
not expressly mandated by a legislative act.117 But Guidelines, however trou-
blesome, provide a means for bridging between EU capital market needs for
certainty and clarity on technical and at times ambiguous rules, particularly in
new areas of regulation, and the cumbersome level 2 rule-making process. In
particular, they allow ESMA – if in an informal manner – to address speedily
material ambiguities in level 1 and level 2 measures, pending regulatory re-
form. ESMA has, however, proved to be adept in managing the risks to its
position (and to the market more generally were Guidelines to be obstructed).
It has recently adopted a position on its approach to Guidelines adoption
which affirms the need for ESMA to meet all the Article 16 ESMA Regulation
criteria governing the adoption of Guidelines, for Guidelines to have a clear
basis in EU law, and for Guidelines to be within ESMA’s scope.118 ESMA also
appears increasingly to be consulting with the Commission before it issues
114 N 23.
115 N 23, at paras 48 and 52.
116 ESMA, ‘Guidelines Compliance Table’ ESMA/2013/765 (2013).
117 N 23, para 54.
118 Summary of Conclusions ESMA Board of Supervisors 2014/BS/89, 20 May 2014.
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Guidelines on potentially contested areas, as was the case, for example, with its
2015 Guidance on the definition of derivatives under MiFID I.119
It may accordingly be possible for ESMA to effectively manage its relationship
with the European Parliament through responsive and informal mechanisms
such as these. But the effectiveness risks attendant on ESMA’s ambiguous
position as a technocratic quasi-rule-maker without formal rule-making
power remain. These risks may become all the greater if the European Parlia-
ment succeeds in gaining greater oversight over ESMA’s internal deliberations
with consequent risks to ESMA’s independence. Here the CMU agenda may
prove to have useful decelerating effects, drawing the co-legislators’ attention
elsewhere to substantive regulatory reforms.
3. Technical Resilience and Flexibility
A hostof more technical difficulties are also becoming apparent. Over the crisis-
era ESMA struggled with rigid timelines for the adoption of BTS proposals and
Technical Advice. Level 1 mandates have, at times, been unclear. Perhaps most
importantly, the level 2 process cannot nimbly adjust or calibrate technical rules
where market conditions so require. The highly technical nature of much of the
crisis-era level 2 rule-book, in combination with the very limited empirical data
available on which these rules could be based (with respect to the EMIR and
MiFID II/MiFIR level 2 rules in particular), makes it highly likely that some
rules will require adjustment as the market implications become clear. But there
is no bespoke procedure for speedily adjusting level 2 rules.
EMIR provides a useful example. It is not possible under current procedures
for ESMA to speedily withdraw or suspend the EMIR clearing obligation
from a particular instrument (which obligation takes the form of an RTS)
where market conditions (such as the default of the CCP which clears the
instrument) so require. Counterparties could, however, face significant risks
were they required to clear instruments which could not, in practice, be
cleared. ESMA has highlighted the significant risks to market stability which
could follow and called for an expedited process which would allow it to make
a decision, through its Board of Supervisors, withdrawing a RTS, subject to
procedural conditions, within a clear and limited framework, and after appro-
priate consultation.120 To take another example, the 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR
level 2 transparency rules, primarily in the form of RTSs, may require suspen-
119 ESMA/2015/675. ESMA initially requested the Commission to take action to address
the ambiguities relating to the definition, following which the Commission suggested
that ESMA adopt Guidelines.
120 ESMA Review of EMIR. No. 1 (n 88).
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sion if, as is possible, unforeseen and drastic liquidity contractions are gener-
ated by the new rules.
The current generation of level 2 RTSs include, for example, detailed rules
governing which assets must be cleared through CCPs and traded on trading
venues; the exact percentage limits on the commodity derivative positions
which may be held by persons; and the particular levels of securitized deriv-
atives trading which render that asset class liquid or illiquid. These highly
technical and instrument-specific RTSs have little in common with the broad
rules initially associated with level 2 rule-making for the EU financial system.
Highly technical and dependent on robust empirical data, their ability to shape
markets is very significant. But so too are the risks which regulatory error in
their construction, or regulatory reliance on poor quality empirical data, pose.
A suspensive power is accordingly functionally compelling. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the institutions, and particular the Commission, will
support the conferral of a suspensive decision-making competence on ESMA,
which would bring ESMA closer to the character of a traditional regulator.121
The legal difficulties alone are considerable. An ESMA power to suspend an
RTS would, for example, imply the exclusion of the Commission, European
Parliament and Council, all of which would have been formally engaged,
reflecting Treaty requirements, in the original RTS adoption process. The
Meroni difficulties are also significant given the degree of discretion such a
suspensive power would confer on ESMA. But resolution of this conundrum
is imperative if the highly technical rule-book, much of which is based on
speculative empirical data, is not to generate prejudicial effects.
4. ESMA, Regulatory Governance, and the CMU Agenda
In the five years since its establishment ESMA has proved itself to be a tech-
nically-expert quasi-regulator and has displayed a significant capacity to in-
tensify the single rule-book, including through its soft law activities. It has also
shown itself to be adept in navigating institutional obstacles nimbly, and in
using fluid and experimentalist techniques which have supported an ongoing
centralization of regulatory governance. The changing nature of EU capital
market law, and in particular the growth of highly technical market-shaping
rules, is exposing a need for additional technocratic capacity, as is underlined
by the growing need for a suspensive rule-making power. Changes may, ac-
cordingly, follow which enhance ESMA’s ability to shape and centralize reg-
ulatory governance in an evolutionary manner. The CMU agenda may accel-
121 The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, eg, is empowered to issue ‘no
action’ letters, in effect suspending relevant rules, where required.
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erate this process of centralization. It is likely to lead, for example, to a number
of additional mandates for level 2 rule-making and thereby to enhance ESMA’s
ability to shape regulatory governance. The execution of the CMU agenda
may also lead to a greater dependence on ESMA and thus to a lessening of the
emerging tensions between ESMA and the Commission and European Parlia-
ment.
But the strains in the level 2 process are becoming apparent after five years of
experience. While ESMA has proved itself to be creative in responding to the
strains in its operating environment, formal changes to the process are neces-
sary. The CMU agenda may prove disruptive if it distracts the political process
from the need to deliver the necessary administrative efficiencies.
V. Supervisory Governance and CMU
1. Supervisory Governance: the Institutional Structure
The more radical possibilities for change to the institutional settlement gov-
erning the EU capital market over the CMU agenda period relate to super-
visory governance. It is more likely, however, that the developments in this
sphere will also be incremental and responsive, reflecting the predictions of
experimentalist governance.
As noted in section II above the supervision of the EU capital market operates
through a de-centralized mechanism and is managed through a network of
home/host NCAs. ESMA plays a largely coordinating role. Its suite of super-
visory convergence powers is designed to empower ESMA to drive super-
visory convergence, raise supervisory standards, and support coordination
and cooperation between NCAs. Key powers in this regard include those
relating to peer review (ESMA Regulation Article 30), information gathering
(Article 35), participation in colleges of supervisors (Article 21), and the sup-
port of a common supervisory culture (Article 29). ESMA also has a series of
direct supervisory powers, although these are typically of a last resort/deter-
rent nature. The most significant ones are those under Articles 17–19 of the
ESMA Regulation and in relation to breach of EU law (Article 17), emergency
conditions (Article 18), and binding mediation (Article 19); with respect to
short selling under the Short Selling Regulation;122 and under MiFIR with
respect to product intervention and position management. In all cases, strict
conditionality applies. The new MiFIR Article 40 product intervention power,
for example, only activates where ESMA action is necessary to address a
122 Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
short selling and aspects of credit default swaps [2012] OJ L86/1.
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significant investor protection concern or threat to the orderly functioning
and integrity of financial/commodity markets or to the stability of the whole/
part of the EU financial system; EU regulatory requirements do not address
the risks; and the relevant NCA(s) have not taken adequate action. In addition,
the ESMA action must not have detrimental effects on financial market effi-
ciency or investors which are disproportionate to the benefits; it must not
create a risk of regulatory arbitrage; and must be taken after consultation with
relevant commodities authorities, where relevant. Detailed level 2 rules are to
amplify these conditions. In two areas – the supervision of credit rating agen-
cies and of the trade repositories which hold OTC derivatives market data –
ESMA is the direct and exclusive EU supervisor. In this last capacity ESMA
operates within, reflecting Meroni dictates, a highly detailed rule-book, in-
cluding with respect to its enforcement activities.
The ESAs’ supervisory powers – and particularly the direct supervisory
powers – generated most controversy over the 2010 ESA negotiations, given
that supervision can lead to conflict between EU and Member State interests
given the potential for fiscal risks. Similarly, ESMA’s distinct supervisory
powers under the Short Selling Regulation and MiFIR have been highly con-
tested, with the UK in particular doubtful as to the necessity for and Treaty/
Meroni resilience of these powers and taking ultimately unsuccessful action
before the Court of Justice of the EU against ESMA’s Short Selling Regulation
powers. Supervision has not, however, been ESMA’s major concern over the
first five years of its operation, reflecting the demands associated with the
construction of the crisis-era rule-book. Supervision can be expected to ac-
quire more prominence, not least given the calls from the ESFS Review and the
IMF for a closer focus by ESMA on supervision.123 ESMA has also recently
placed supervision, and in particular supervisory convergence, at the core of its
Strategic Orientation for 2016–2020.124
Accordingly, how might the current institutional settlement governing super-
vision, and in particular ESMA’s role, evolve over the CMU reform period?
The question is all the more germane as, if there is significant progress towards
a CMU, additional risks to financial stability may follow if funding becomes
more dependent on market-based sources125 – although stability benefits
should also follow from the greater diversification of funding away from bank
sources. As is the case with regulatory governance, an incremental intensifi-
cation of supervisory governance at EU level, driven by ESMA and at the
administrative level, can be expected to occur over the CMU agenda period.
123 See the discussions at n 66.
124 N 70.
125 ECB (n 8) 3. The Bank of England, the counterweight to the ECB outside Banking
Union, has raised similar concerns: n 95, 2.
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‘Big bang’ reforms, in the form of the conferral of new supervisory powers on
ESMA or of the construction of a new supervisory authority are much less
likely. Nonetheless, ESMA’s administrative influence can be predicted as lead-
ing to a significant degree of centralization, particularly with respect to super-
visory convergence, albeit that ESMA’s ability to shape pan-EU supervision
may be limited by legal ambiguities the resolution of which may be neglected
given competing demands under the CMU agenda.
2. Direct ESMA Supervision and the CMU Agenda
The CMU agenda – as currently constituted – is not a risk mutualization
project. It does not require direct, centralized supervision (on the lines of
the Banking Union arrangements) in order to support related risk mutualiza-
tion. As considered in section III, the political, constitutional, and operational
obstacles to such centralized supervision are considerable, even for the euro
area. But what does ESMA’s current suite of direct powers suggest as to the
future direction of supervision for the single EU capital market?
With respect to ESMA Regulation Article 17 (ESMA action following NCA
breach of EU law), there is little experience yet with ESMA’s powers to impose
decisions on NCAs in breach of EU law and to impose related decisions on
market participants. ESMA has yet to take such action, although requests have
been made for ESMA action; the ESA Board of Appeal has affirmed that
Article 17 is a discretionary power.126 The non-action by ESMA is not entirely
surprising or prejudicial. As ESMA’s 2012 Decision on the Article 17 process127
underlines, the Article 17 power sits at the top of a pyramid of powers and
practices which ESMA can use to support compliance by NCAs with EU law.
These include the adoption of Guidelines; peer review; and the support of the
development of a common approach to rule application and supervision
through the Board of Supervisors. The Article 17 Decision clarifies the scope
of Article 17 and reserves this power for serious breaches of EU law,128 but it
126 Decision of the Board of Appeal BoA 2013-008, 24 June 2013. The Board of Appeal
emphasized that the art 17 power was discretionary, that EBA (the ESA engaged), as a
small body, was not in a position to investigate every admissible complaint, and that,
following the correct application of its discretion, EBA was empowered not to take
action even where the request to take action was admissible and related to a breach of
EU law.
127 ESMA/2012/BS/87. The Decision addresses issues such as the admissibility criteria for
art 17 action and defines the scope of the art 17 power.
128 The ‘investigation factors’ which ESMA will consider prior to taking art 17 action
include whether the alleged breach undermines the foundations of the rule of law,
concerns a repeated infringement, and whether it may have a significant, direct impact
on ESMA’s objectives: 2012 Article 17 Decision (n 127), Annex 2.
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also identifies the other mechanisms, such as peer review or binding media-
tion, which can act as alternative channels for addressing breach of EU law
difficulties where appropriate.129 Softer enforcement measures, such as peer
review, are being deployed more robustly by ESMA (as noted further below).
In addition, flagrant breach of EU law is unlikely to be a regular occurrence
across the Board of Supervisors. More difficulties are likely to arise with
respect to discretionary applications/interpretations of EU law, in relation
to which the Article 19 binding mediation power engages. Finally, while Ar-
ticle 17 provides ESMA with a strong deterrent capacity, the risks associated
with ESMA proceeding publicly against a member NCA are likely to be
significantly greater than any benefits. Ultimately, Article 17 is likely to oper-
ate best as a deterrent and signalling device. ESMA’s restraint on Article 17
accordingly suggests a commitment to a slower and more evolutionary cen-
tralization of supervisory convergence and a well-judged wariness of more
radical but disruptive interventions.
ESMA’s capacity to shape pan-EU supervisory practices in an optimal manner
is more likely to be weakened by the difficulties associated with ESMA Reg-
ulation Article 19 (ESMA’s power to impose decisions following a binding
mediation between NCAs). Recourse to binding mediation can be expected to
increase if NCAs take different approaches to rule implementation and super-
vision. While the single rule-book governing the EU capital market is becom-
ing ever more detailed, room remains for interpretation and discretion. This is
particularly the case with respect to the ‘proportionate’ application of rules;
proportionality mechanisms are a particular feature of the crisis-era rule-book
and are beginning to receive close institutional attention.130 While proportion-
ality mechanisms provide an important safety valve for NCAs with respect to
rule implementation, differences in interpretation can be expected. EBA, for
example, recently faced significant difficulties in reaching an agreed EBA
position on whether a ‘proportionate’ application of the CRD IV remunera-
tion rules allowed for rules to be dis-applied entirely.131 Binding mediation is
accordingly likely to become of increasing importance given the likelihood of
different NCA approaches emerging as to how proportionality requirements
apply. The binding mediation tool is also of particular importance where
129 Ibid, Annex 2.
130 Eg, the evidence by SSM Chairperson Nouy before the European Parliament on ‘The
principle of proportionality: application in the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (Letter
from SSM Chairperson Nouy to ECON Committee Member Giegold, 2 October
2015); and the concern expressed by the January 2016 Balz Resolution (n 23, para 58).
131 EBA, ‘Consultation on Draft Guidelines on Sound Remuneration Policies’ EBA/CP/
2015)/03 (2015) (the Guidelines have since been adopted (EBA/GL/2015/22)). EBA
subsequently adopted an Opinion which called for legislative revisions to CRD IV to
make clear the scope of the proportionality mechanism (EBA/Op/2015/25).
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NCAs fail to reach joint decisions within colleges of supervisors. The binding
mediation tool has not, however, been regularly used by the ESAs: ESMA has
not deployed it, while EBA has reported on only two instances of media-
tion.132 This may reflect the legal risks which the Article 19 tool generates.
These legal risks are generated by the ambiguities as to whether the Article 19
power to impose a binding mediation decision applies where an NCA, in good
faith, exercises a discretionary power in a manner which it regards to be in
accordance with EU law, and another NCA disagrees with the interpretation,
leading to the need for mediation. In such circumstances, can ESMA impose a
decision governing the exercise of discretion by NCAs? Reflecting the concern
of the UK that Article 19 not become a vehicle for fettering NCA discretion,
recital 32 of the ESMA Regulation provides that, in cases where the relevant EU
law confers discretion on NCAs, ESMA decisions under Article 19 cannot re-
place the exercise in compliance with EU law of that discretion. The legal effect
of this recital is ambiguous. A sounder legal footing for a restrictive interpreta-
tion of Article 19 comes from the 2014 SRM Regulation which amends the EBA
Regulation (which otherwise follows the ESMA Regulation) to provide that
EBA’s Article 19 powers cannot apply to national resolution authorities where
these authorities exercise discretionary powers or make policy choices (SRM
Regulation,Article95).TheCommissionhascommittedtoexaminingthescope
of Article 19, reflecting some ESA concern as to its scope.133 But the power
remains ambiguous. The lack of clarity does not, as yet, appear to have caused
significant difficulties for ESMA. Nonetheless, the achievement of the CMU
agenda requires that some form of mechanism, short of recourse to the Court of
Justice of the EU, be available for addressing inter-NCA conflicts relating to the
application of EU capital markets law. The CMU agenda has, for example,
underlined the importance of smooth cross-border investment fund capital
allocation and fund marketing to the deepening of market finance in the EU.
But where difficulties arise with respect to interpretations of the highly complex
fund rule-book, ESMA’s powers are limited. The CMU agenda may, however,
reduce the appetite of the co-legislators for technical reforms of this nature,
particularly given the sensitivities which Article 19 generates for the UK.
With respect to the conferral of additional supervisory powers on ESMA, as is
suggested in section III it is unlikely that ESMAwill be transformed into some
form of ‘SSM’ for the capital markets. It is more likely that ESMAwill acquire
additional direct supervisory powers, given the ease with which the co-legis-
lators have conferred additional discrete supervisory powers on ESMA in an
132 Its 2014 Annual Report reported on two successful instances of mediation in 2014.
133 EBA Chairman Enria called for a clarification of the ESA Regulations to remove
textual ambiguities which restrict the practical effectiveness of art 19: Speech on
‘The Single Market after Banking Union’ 18 November 2013.
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incremental manner since 2011 (including with respect to trade repositories
(2012 EMIR) and product intervention and position management (2014 Mi-
FID II/MiFIR)). But any such additional conferrals of power are likely to be
made on an ad hoc and incremental basis. The Commission, while showing
some enthusiasm for considering the EU centralization of supervisory powers
over shadow banking and CCPs,134 has not, under the CMU agenda, called for
additional powers to be conferred on ESMA; it has focused instead on super-
visory convergence.135 ESMA has been similarly circumspect. While it has
suggested that it is ‘uniquely positioned to develop a European supervisory
approach that could have strong benefits for pan-European actors’, ESMA has
also underlined that ‘while clearly not asking for new areas of supervision’, it
‘stands ready to assume such new tasks’ should they be conferred.136 Func-
tionally, is difficult to argue at present that achievement of the CMU agenda
requires some degree of EU centralization of supervision for particular market
segments – even assuming the Meroni and other political/institutional/fiscal
constraints could be addressed. Networked prospectus approval, for example,
appears to be working reasonably well,137 while ESMA’s supervisory conver-
gence activities in this area are intensifying138 and more detailed harmonization
of NCA supervisory powers is proposed under the Commission’s 2015 Pros-
pectus Regulation Proposal.139 The failure of a critical financial market infra-
structure – such as a major trading venue or CCP – could, of course, generate
an existential threat to the stability of the EU capital market and drive change.
But the complexity of the fiscal and constitutional difficulties which such EU
centralization of supervision would generate suggests that these difficulties are
unlikely to be addressed under the CMU agenda, absent a re-setting change to
market conditions.
3. Supporting Supervisory Convergence
The most immediate influence on the institutional development of supervisory
governance for the EU capital market is likely to be exerted by ESMA’s ap-
proach to supervisory convergence.
134 Commission ESFS Review (n 26).
135 CMU Action Plan (n 3) 26.
136 ESMA, Response to the Commission Green Paper on Building a Capital Markets
Union 2015/ESMA/865, 21 May 2015, 5.
137 ESMA’s 2012 Prospectus Peer Review, eg, examined the practical procedures adopted
to review prospectuses and found full application of relevant ESMA Good Practice
Principles in 25 Member States.
138 Including a current peer review on prospectus approval.
139 N 4.
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Stronger supervisory convergence (or the application of consistent supervi-
sory practices across NCAs and the encouragement of best practices) has long
been an aim of EU capital market law and policy, but it has been recently
identified as essential to the achievement of CMU. The Commission in its
CMU Action Plan highlighted supervisory convergence; called on ESMA to
strengthen its supervisory convergence activities; and underlined the impor-
tance of consistency in supervision and in supervisory outcomes to the success
of the CMU agenda.140 The European Parliament is also a supporter of stron-
ger supervisory convergence.141 Supervisory convergence as the main influ-
ence on the evolution of supervisory governance for the EU capital market has
much to commend it. It requires dialogue and cooperation between NCAs
with respect to the sharing of best practice, the improvement of standards, and
the enhancement of coordination. It is based on responsive supervisory learn-
ing and coordination, facilitated by ESMA, rather than on the top-down
imposition of standards or centralized exercise of supervisory powers. It also
accommodates a degree of diversity where necessary to reflect diverse market
conditions.
The prominence given to supervisory convergence by the CMU agenda sug-
gests that ESMAwill be the major influence on the development of supervisory
governance for the EU capital market over the CMU agenda period. ESMA’s
incentives to pursue a vigorous supervisory convergence programme are
strong. The constitutional space is relatively clear; a relatively limited suite of
powers is needed for ESMA to act effectively; the opportunities supervisory
convergence creates for constructive dialogue between ESMA and NCAs are
potentially considerable, as is the potential for strengthening ESMA’s Board of
Supervisors and for pursuing a supranational, EU agenda; and the risk of con-
flict with ESMA’s key institutional stakeholders is relatively low. NCAs, for
example, can be expected to be (relatively at least) supportive of supervisory
convergence measures, not least as such measures may give NCAs leverage for
demanding additional supervisory resources and related powers at national
level, while the Commission and Parliament are supportive. It is not accord-
ingly surprising that ESMA recently placed the support of supervisory con-
vergence at the core of its 2016–2020 Strategic Orientation;142 identified super-
visory convergence as a means through which it can support the CMU
agenda;143 underlined that from 2016 onwards its focus will increasingly shift
from rule-making to implementation and that supervisory convergence will be
140 CMU Action Plan (n 3).
141 European Parliament Resolution (n 66).
142 N 70, 7–8.
143 Its Board of Supervisors has, eg, highlighted that supervisory convergence could act
as a substitute for regulation: Summary of Conclusions ESMA Board of Supervisors
ESMA/BS/59, 19 March 2015.
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a core focus of its activities;144 and adopted its first supervisory convergence
work programme.145 ESMA has also highlighted risk assessment, data collec-
tion, and peer review as key priorities for the next period.146 This new focus on
supervisory convergence is likely to lead to greater central steering of NCA
supervisory practices by ESMA. By way of illustration, two techniques used by
ESMA to support supervisory convergence are considered below.
Peer Review
Peer review has come to form a key element of the post-crisis global settlement
on supervision, as reflected in the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) regular and
intensifying peer review exercises and the commitment by FSB members to
regular ‘FSAP’ reviews of their regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement sys-
tems by the IMF/World Bank.147 ESMA’s formal Articles 17 and 19 powers are
ill-suited to supporting the embedding of good supervisory practices. Peer
review, which identifies and seeks to encourage good practices, and which
can have a coercive element, is likely to be significantly more effective in
strengthening supervisory convergence across the EU capital market.
The ESMA Regulation Article 30 peer review regime requires ESMA periodi-
cally to organize and conduct peer review analyses of NCAs’ activities to
further strengthen consistency in supervisory outcomes. ESMA must also
develop methods to allow for objective assessment and comparison between
NCAs, and ESMA peer review should assess, inter alia: the adequacy of NCA
resources and governance arrangements, including with regard to the effective
implementation of EU rules and NCA capacity to respond to market develop-
ments; the degree of convergence in the application of EU law and supervisory
practices and the extent to which supervisory practices achieve the objectives
of EU law; and good practices developed by NCAs which might be of benefit
to other NCAs. The coercive effect of peer review is also addressed. ESMA
may subsequently issue guidelines and recommendations to NCAs and NCAs
are under an obligation to ‘endeavour to follow’ these guidelines and recom-
mendations. The results of the peer review may also be disclosed publicly,
subject to the agreement of the relevant NCA.
Peer review is currently carried out through ESMA’s Supervisory Conver-
gence Standing Committee and in accordance with the ESMA Protocol and
Methodology on Peer Review.148 Since its establishment, ESMA has under-
144 ESMA, ‘2016 Work Programme’ ESMA/2015/1475 (2015) 5.
145 ESMA/2016/2013.
146 Strategic Orientation 2016–2020 (n 70) 7–8.
147 FSB, ‘Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards’ (2010).
148 ESMA, ‘ESMA Review Panel Methodology’ ESMA/2013/1709.
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taken a number of peer reviews, including with respect to the market abuse
regime, the prospectus authorization process, and the application of the im-
portant Money Market Fund Guidelines;149 it has also conducted a mapping
exercise on contingency powers for crises.150 Over 2014, peer review exercises
were carried out with respect to ESMA’s automated trading Guidelines, Mi-
FID I rules on ‘fair, clear, and not misleading’ disclosures, and MiFID I rules
on best execution, while 2015 saw peer reviews on short selling and market-
making supervisory practices; prospectus approval; MiFID I suitability re-
quirements; and CCP college operation.151
Exemplifying ESMA’s strengthening ability to support convergence, and a
productive Board of Supervisors dynamic, ESMA peer review is becoming
increasingly intensive, regular, and robust. By contrast with EBA, for example,
which has been slower to engage with peer review (reflecting, perhaps, the
degree of harmonization achieved by the SREP and the complexities of SSM/
single market dynamics given the ECB’s role in overseeing supervision within
the SSM), peer review is a standing item on ESMA’s Board of Supervisors
meetings. The tone of ESMA peer review is becoming more robust, attesting
to the ability of the Board of Supervisors to peer review its member NCAs in
an effective manner. ESMA’s initial reviews focused on mapping different
approaches to supervision. The recent 2015 peer review on supervision of best
execution requirements, however, is notable for its detail and for the directness
of its message.152 ESMA found, for example, that convergence, and the level of
NCA monitoring of best execution, were relatively low and that NCAs ex-
perienced problems in prioritizing resources. It also identified the six NCAs
which had been subject to onsite inspection by ESMA and made specific and
public recommendations. In a related development, which provides an addi-
tional indication of ESMA’s strengthening ability to take a coercive position
against its member NCAs, ESMA, for the first time, has criticized short selling
measures adopted by one of its member NCAs. Under the 2012 Short Selling
Regulation153 ESMA is empowered to provide an opinion on short selling
measures adopted by NCAs. January 2016 saw ESMA, for the first time, issue
a negative opinion in which it found emergency action by the Greek super-
visor not to be appropriate or proportionate.154 Board of Supervisors dynamics
can change, but current indications seem to augur well for ESMA’s ability to
149 ESMA/2012/270 and ESMA/2013/805; ESMA/2012/300; and ESMA/2013/476, re-
spectively.
150 ESMA/2011/261.
151 See ESMA Annual Report for 2014 and ESMA Chairman Maijoor Annual Statements
to the ECON Committee, September 2014 and 2015.
152 ESMA/2015/494.
153 Regulation No. 236/2012 [2012] OJ L86/1.
154 ESMA, Opinion, 11 January 2016 (ESMA/2016/28).
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deploy peer review (and similar review) mechanisms to support strong super-
visory convergence across the single capital market, and to adopt a hierarchical
and coercive approach where appropriate.
Colleges of Supervisors
Colleges of supervisors are most strongly associated in EU financial gover-
nance with banking governance and with the group/subsidiary/systemic
branches colleges of supervisors which are required under CRD IV/CRR
and in which EBA plays a key oversight role.155 But they also play a role
in capital market governance. ESMA, like all the ESAs, is conferred with a
range of powers to support supervisory colleges. It must contribute to pro-
moting and monitoring the efficient, effective, and consistent functioning of
colleges of supervisors and to fostering the coherence of the application of
EU law among colleges (ESMA Regulation, Article 21(1)). ESMA staff are
empowered to participate in the activities of colleges, including on-site ex-
aminations carried out jointly by two or more NCAs (Article 21(1)). ESMA
is also to take the lead in ensuring a consistent and coherent functioning of
colleges, taking account of the systemic risk posed by financial market par-
ticipants (Article 21(2)). ESMA may establish and manage information sys-
tems for colleges, initiate and co-ordinate EU stress tests to assess the resil-
ience of financial market participants, and promote effective and efficient
supervisory activities. ESMA may also request further deliberation by a col-
lege where it considers a college decision would lead to an incorrect appli-
cation of EU law or not contribute to convergence in supervisory practices
(Article 21(2)).
To date, colleges have not played a major role in capital market governance in
the EU, given the dominance of home NCA control and of cross-border
activity through branches and services which obviates the need for colleges
(colleges typically govern home NCA/home NCA coordination within a
group where cross-border activity is carried out through subsidiaries). There
is, however, one important exception: the 2012 EMIR requires colleges of
supervisors for CCPs and confers a related set of powers on ESMA. The
ESMA experience with the EMIR colleges – while limited thus far – provides
accordingly important indicators as to how ESMA is likely to shape the oper-
ation of these operationally-critical colleges and to shape, thereby, the further
centralization of supervisory governance.
Under EMIR, CCP colleges are charged with a range of tasks, chief among
155 See, eg, EBA, ‘Accomplishment of 2015 EBA Colleges Action Plan and 2016 Action
Plan’ (2016).
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them CCP authorization and model review. ESMA is a member of all CCP
colleges (EMIR, Article 18) and facilitates the adoption by colleges of the
‘authorization opinion’ on which CCP authorization depends (Article 19).
ESMA is also charged with proposing BTSs and adopting Guidelines govern-
ing CCP colleges; with peer review of CCP colleges; and with the coordina-
tion of CCP stress testing. Eighteen CCP colleges have now been constituted
under EMIR, and ESMA has been quick to establish its authority in this area.
It has, for example; produced Guidelines on the written agreements required
of colleges and adopted an Opinion on college composition and voting which
restricts the ECB/SSM to one college seat (the ECB/SSM called for two – as
the bank of the currency of issue, and as supervisor).156 ESMA’s first (2015)
review of CCP colleges suggests close engagement by ESMA with the oper-
ations of CCP colleges,157 as well as an ESMA appetite for robust and direct
reporting on CCP college weaknesses. ESMA reported on a generally good
level of cooperation and engagement within colleges, but it also warned that
college chairs could be more constructive with respect to information-sharing
and that where information was not shared NCAs were more likely to abstain
on or vote against key college decisions.
4. A Disruptive Environment and Institutional Tensions?
The extent of ESMA’s ability to shape supervisory governance is in part a
function of its institutional environment. In many respects that environment
is currently stable. In particular, the current institutional, and also political and
market, support for supervisory convergence provides ESMA with the oppor-
tunity to strengthen its supervisory capacity without it trespassing on unstable
constitutional or political territory or it encountering significant institutional
resistance. But the SSM may become a source of disruption.
ESMA has considerable incentives to establish and reinforce its position as the
capital market/conduct supervision counterweight to the SSM, at least with
respect to EU-level coordination.158 These incentives are likely to become all
the stronger as prudential regulators globally, and within the EU, come to
focus on the stability risks posed by capital markets and to encroach on the
traditional territory of securities/capital market regulators. ESMA appears, for
example, to have been robust in refusing the ECB two seats on the CCP
156 ESMA/2013/661 and ESMA/2015/838.
157 N 91. ESMA has, eg, identified issues of concern with respect to CCP compliance.
158 N Moloney, ‘Banking Union and the Implications for Financial Market Union in the
EU: Convergence or Divergence’ in Busch and Ferrarini (n 30) 524.
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colleges of supervisors which ESMA oversees.159 Whether or not ESMA and
ECB/SSM relations are likely to become disruptive is not yet clear. It seems
reasonable to suggest that a cooperative approach will develop, not least given
ESMA’s status as the location of a massive data-set on the EU capital market
and its now well-evidenced technical expertise. Recent skirmishes may simply
evidence the inevitable tensions generated as institutions – even where there is
a great disparity in power – learn to play a new institutional game. ESMA and
the ECB/SSM have, for example, successfully negotiated a Memorandum of
Understanding on institutional cooperation160 and ESMA Board of Supervi-
sors meeting minutes suggest a cooperative and productive dynamic. None-
theless, the potential for tension remains, as is clear from the ECB’s recent call
for the regulatory regime governing EMIR colleges, in which ESMA plays a
key role, to be revised in light of the role of the SSM.161
VI. Conclusion
This article speculates that, reflecting the insights of experimentalist gover-
nance theory, the CMU agenda is not likely to lead to radical changes to the
institutional governance of the EU capital market. A ‘bottom-up,’ ESMA-led,
incremental, iterative, but increasingly intensifying process of convergence is
likely to be observed, given that ESMA’s interests, powers, and preferences are
likely to be the major influence on how institutional governance develops over
the CMU-agenda period. In this regard, the evolution of institutional gover-
nance for the EU capital market reflects the evolution of institutional gover-
nance more generally: the preferences of administrative actors are increasingly
coming to rank alongside national political preferences as the major influences
on how institutional governance for the financial system develops. This fluid
process of governance evolution is, and without re-setting the current institu-
tional settlement for EU financial governance, likely to lead to significantly
greater EU centralization – at the administrative level – of regulatory and
supervisory governance for the EU capital market. There are, however, ob-
structions which may disrupt this evolutionary process and which the CMU
agenda is unlikely to address.
This discussion does not speculate more generally as to whether or not this form
of incremental institutional centralization is functionally optimal for the EU
capitalmarketor for theachievement of theCMUagenda.Thedegreeofcentral-
ization which is likely to be observed is likely to generate more technically-
159 ESMA/2015/838.
160 ESMA Press Release, 28 January 2016.
161 The ECB ‘strongly believes’ EMIR should be revised to reflect the specific role of the
SSM: ECB, ‘Response to the Commission Consultation on EMIR’, 2 September 2015.
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informed rule-making and stronger consistency in supervisory practices across
the EU. The opportunities for NCAs to diverge, and for national experimenta-
tion, are likely to decrease. The interests of and risks generated by large pan-EU
groups and systemically-significant actors can be expected to preoccupy ESMA
to a greater extent, particularly given the greater stability risks associated with
more intense capital market activity. The long over-shadowed retail market
agenda can be expected to remain in the shadows – notwithstanding the Com-
mission’s CMU-driven commitment to a new approach to the retail financial
services.162 Similarly, EU financial governance might be expected to become less
sensitive to smaller firms and to specialist capital market actors. It can, however,
be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty that the greater consistency
and clarity in the single rule-book which should follow from further central-
ization of regulatory governance through ESMA should enhance legal certainty
and the operating environment for firms, particularly pan-EU groups. With
respect to supervisory governance, greater consistency, driven by ESMA, in
supervisory practices should similarly reduce transaction costs.
Neither does this discussion speculate as to whether the accountability mech-
anisms which apply to ESMA will remain fit for purpose as the nature of
ESMA’s role evolves. EU accountability mechanisms over agencies are typi-
cally designed to reflect the Treaty balance of power and the interests of the
Member States and of the Council, Commission, and Parliament;163 ESMA is,
for example, formally accountable to the European Parliament and Council
(ESMA Regulation, Article 3). But as ESMA’s role and influence shifts, closer
scrutiny is required of its accountability structures. Should, for example, a new
form of board governance be designed, which allows for oversight by inde-
pendent actors or representatives of particular constituencies? And if so, how
might these accountability mechanisms fit within current Treaty restraints and
requirements? There are multiple ways of designing accountability structures,
as is clear from cognate developments in the sphere of international financial
governance.164 As the EU gropes its way towards a new administrative law on
EU financial system governance, the CMU agenda could usefully expand to
include an examination of the accountability of the structures of EU financial
governance.
The degree of institutional governance centralization predicted by this dis-
cussion is likely to occur independently of the CMU agenda. It remains to be
162 As reflected in Commission (EC), ‘Better products, more choice and greater oppor-
tunities for consumers and businesses’ (Green Paper on Retail Financial Services)
COM (2015) 630, 10 December 2015.
163 See, eg, M Everson, ‘A Technology of Expertise: EU Financial Services Agencies’
(2012) LEQS WP No. 49/2012.
164 Barr (n 28).
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seen whether the CMU agenda injects an accelerating factor by providing
ESMA with a favourable operating environment. Conversely, CMU may dis-
tract the EU political and policy process from necessary institutional reforms.
And the prospect of a euro area Financial Union driving a major resetting
change to institutional governance cannot be discounted, even if the array of
political, institutional, and constitutional obstacles is formidable.
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